Unconventional Approaches to Teaming Agreement Management

In the government contract area, teaming agreements are in wide spread use.  Yet, companies are using them like robots, which means they are not thinking through the consequences, enforceability, and details of their business and marketing bargains. For example, most people do not realize that most teaming agreements are not fully legally enforceable the way they are currently written.

In many teaming agreements, there are:

  • no detailed specification of work share between teammates;

  • no price in terms of what you will be paid for your work;

  • no subcontract terms and conditions;

  • no delivery schedule; and

  • no detail specifications for what each party will do.

People negotiating team agreements should read the Virginia Supreme Court decision in Schaefer v. Cordant, Inc. (link to full decision https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1059978/wj-schafer-assoc-v-cordant-inc/). You will be likely surprised at what the court finds to be insufficient details in the subject of teaming agreement, which may be similar to yours.

If the teaming agreement is not fully legally enforceable, you then have basically an internal and external marketing tool in the teaming agreement. You may market to your prime. The prime may use your presence and data to market to the government. But all of these documents and discussions about them do not involve legal decisions, they are really business decisions.

What do you want to agree to with your prime and your sub in order to be in the best position for the future off the business?

Only you know that.


Do you have a question about teaming agreement management related to subcontractors?

Let our experts help.

The Need for Experienced Federal Contracting Officers: And Why Contractors Should Care

There is a shortage of experienced contract officers in the Federal Government, and the solution is no simply to hire more people.

There is a shortage of experienced contract officers in the Federal Government, and the solution is no simply to hire more people.

Other Resources in this section

The Federal Government always has an ongoing series of initiatives aimed at stimulating the economy and the job market, renewing U. S. infrastructure and making the government more efficient. These initiatives may well accelerate after the 2016 election.

As numerous articles and reports have pointed out, performing this work requires major effort by trained, experienced government procurement and oversight personnel.  Unfortunately, it is generally acknowledged that because of past funding constraints and retirements, sufficient experienced government personnel does not exist to perform the government's procurement business today, even without major new requirements.

One critical indicator appears in the Department of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which reported that the number of Defense acquisition professionals had declined by 10 percent during a decade that saw contractual obligations triple.(p.27 of the Final Report, Commission on Wartime Contracting)(See also the End Note 1, Excerpts and Comments regarding a Coast Guard Procurement and the assigned Contracting Officer, as an example.)

The reaction of Congress to this problem has been generally funding to "hire more procurement personnel".  While this is a needed starting point, this will not solve the problem—neither short-term nor long-term.  Indeed no one seems to be doing serious thinking about the problem—just hire more people.

This is a multifaceted problem, with multifaceted solutions.  It requires thought, discussion, and analysis to affect realistic solutions. It requires respect for many divergent views and issues.   It is not just an issue of the government hiring more people.

There is no quick fix. But the problem can unquestionably be solved long-term if it is understood. Understanding it requires effort.

And this problem greatly affects contractors who should care about it being solved because it affects them so directly as well.  This not just the government’s problem.

Impact on Contractors

This government contracting personnel problem is very serious for contractors and their management. They must deal with these new contracting officers and inexperienced personnel—they can create problem contracts that have disastrous impact on contractors—including staggering losses and default terminations. (See e.g. Trust Title Company v. United States, (Ct of Fed Cl 2015), aff’d per cir., cert denied). These not thought through action often include:

a. Change orders are issued, but there is no recognition of item or funding for them.

b. Delays exist which are the government’s responsibility, yet the contractor is ordered to finish by the assigned scheduled date. This is a classic, but often unrecognized acceleration.

c. Inexperienced contracting officers are therefore a danger to a contractor’s work on a program, and, if a large contract, a danger to the company’s long-term viability and existence.

Contractors must identify these “inexperienced” personnel before they start performance—so they can protect their companies. What can they do?

a. They can and should assign their most experienced own contract administration personnel to a contract with an inexperienced government contracting officer (or contracting officer representatives).

b. They must be constantly on alert for an unknowing constructive change activity being undertaken by the inexperienced government contracting personnel.

c. They must be giving written notices of all government delaying events and actions (whether or not the government personnel agrees), so as to protect the contractor’s schedule and avoid a potential default termination.

What is NOT the Problem

An initial step in solving these problems is determining who is “trained, experienced procurement personnel” who we all wish to have available to do the government's procurement work. 

Most people think of this as a long-term government employee who has been placing and administering many contracts for many years.  That is an appropriate attempt at a definition, but it only satisfies half of the need in terms of experience: do we know what these “experienced” people are really doing every day?

For many years, experienced government personnel, because of time pressure and lack of support, have placed much of their emphasis on the "form" of procurement—getting contracts placed, using the right boilerplate terms and conditions, getting contractors paid on time, trying to ensure that there is some initial competition for the work, and making sure the contractor finishes the work on time.  This pressured approach to "getting the work placed"/"getting the work performed" is often in the nature of a paperwork production line effort. (Fixes to the whole paperwork production line approach are a separate issue for a separate discussion.)

Unfortunately, the production line approach itself misses at least half of the real need—having experienced procurement people actually providing:

a. Oversight of the performance process, who understand what contractors are really doing when they perform government work,

b. Knowledge and action to prevent inappropriate activities that contractors are performing, and

c. Proactive work to ensure that the government gets the most from contractors for its procurement dollars spent.

These needs overlap—but it is the focus that is important—knowing and anticipating what contractors are doing or not doing. After years in the job, good contracting officers understand this—they learn it from on the job training. It could be trained for—but it generally is not.

Again, see the Coast Guard contract excerpts in the end note. Can’t we do better than this? Can we train people to do a through c above? Of course, we can, but we are not doing it today.

The Use of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)

Enter the missing link in federal procurements—the SMEs. In many other areas in the federal government (and private industry), it is customary to use "subject matter experts" or SMEs.  If you want to prepare a training video for a group of soldiers to perform a type of Special Forces extraction operation, you hire a retired sergeant who has been there and done that to do the training video.  They are the subject matter experts, and the government routinely procures this type of service. 

Along these same lines, it is primarily contractor personnel and their representatives and advisers who understand the contractor's motivations and methods of operation. These contractor personnel are actually the "subject matter" experts on major elements of federal procurement.  Yet they are routinely disregarded as a resource by the federal government in the procurement area. When they offer to help—they are disregarded as having “only practical knowledge” or just experienced in “disputes”, etc.

When only government people are used as “subject matter experts” on procurements (and training), no more than half the needed knowledge needed is provided. The author knows, he has been there, tried to help, and been rejected as having only “practical, contractor side knowledge”.

Do we need that contractor SME knowledge to improve the federal procurement process? Of course, we do.

The Commission on Wartime Contracting Final Report ( p.29) (2011) recognized this issue:

This heavy reliance on contractors requires a fully capable and fully deployable acquisition infrastructure and workforce. In addition, non-acquisition officials who possess the necessary subject-matter expertise to perform requirement analysis, program management, and contractor oversight are especially needed.

Oversight for Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA)

A closely related problem which is a most pressing need today is again not in the mechanics of doing the procurement, rather it is in knowledge-based oversight of the procurement to ensure that there is no "fraud waste and abuse" in the procurement itself. “Fraud” oversight is most often handled by the Justice Department, and the “waste and abuse” portion is most often handled by the agency Inspector Generals.  These agencies also desperately need "subject matter experts" in order to perform their tasks effectively.  They cannot get that from government employees only who have been pressured over the years to emphasize “form over substance"—get the contract placed and performed, then worry about oversight later. [See FWA End Note.]

Some Interim Conclusions

So we currently have exactly the wrong approach to quality procurement and quality oversight. Government employees are overwhelmed by paperwork obligations. They have no time, and little knowledge to perform effective proactive contract oversight. Neither procurement agencies, the Justice Department nor the Inspector Generals have adequate access to "subject matter experts" outside the government.  Government employees alone cannot provide this “subject matter expert" knowledge. They often do not know what contractors are doing, their approach, measures, etc.

What must be done to solve this problem?

Some Real Solutions—And Analysis to Get There

The author certainly does not have all the answers. But there are some obvious building blocks to solve the problems.

Recognize Good Procurement is Not a Production Line for Paper

Hiring more people to eventually become experienced procurement personnel, but letting agencies do this in a business as usual approach as in the past will not work.  The emphasis cannot be just on having a type of production line worker to place procurement paperwork.  That is what exists today. That is exactly the wrong approach. The government must acknowledge this problem, own it, and move on to something better.

And Then Recognize Form is of Secondary Importance To Quality Procurement Work

There must be major emphasis on proactive oversight by new and existing personnel in the contracting area.  When one thinks about it, the form of the procurement should be done electronically by a computer system and take little effort—the major amount of effort should be on oversight. 

This is exactly the way it occurs in private industry.  "Form" of the procurement is largely ignored in private industry.  Oversight predominates because that is how the commercial operation gets maximum value for its procurement dollar. 

Of course, the Federal Government has unique requirements.  That does not mean it cannot learn from private industry's approach, which is almost completely economically motivated—getting the most value for the dollar spent. Should that not be the government’s motivation too?

Existing Government Training

From a training point of view for new hires and existing government employees, there is a hodgepodge of training sources.  Although the government has high-quality training venues, they do not appear to be well integrated, nor do they have the knowledge resources to get the job done because they lack industry experienced SME’s. Therefore they are only training to half the subjects or less. Government people from the “production line” of forms era, should not be the only trainers—again only one-half or less of the needed knowledge will be trained to.

Existing Private Training

It must also be recognized that there are numerous outside private training courses in existence and vendors for them.  Much of this training and coursework is fairly generalized in the procurement area.  It does not address the problems set out above.  It does not itself have any oversight or integration of content government-wide.

It is good training for refreshing knowledge or orienting new procurement people, but does not deal with the problems above.

An Integrated Approach

The government is making a major mistake in thinking that Army procurement is different from defense procurement and that defense procurement is different from NASA procurement or Interior Department procurement.  The important oversight functions in procurement are largely the same government-wide.  Breaking up most procurement training by agencies, by civilian and defense, or supply and construction make no sense whatever. 

Of course, the boilerplate form operation may have differences between agencies, but that is much easier to deal with and there is clearly some need for specialized agency training.  None of that detracts from the fact that procurement oversight is a government-wide operation and should be largely trained for in that fashion.

Bottom Line

Short-Term Fix

The Federal Government needs massive amounts of training for new procurement personnel and training must be largely in the oversight area. Form filling out can be readily accomplished for contracts by computer programs. It is not the real problem.  

If the government does not make this effort in training for oversight functions, massive dollars will be squandered in fraud, waste, and abuse situations.  Some of the shortfalls in training and experience can be satisfied by the use of "subject matter experts’ to aid and assist existing personnel.

On A Long-Term Basis

The government must integrate its overall training functions for procurement personnel. It is time to merge most existing training functions.  Having numerous different agencies and “schools” engaged in training functions is wasteful and does not get the job done.  It promotes disparity in treatment and inefficiency by an agency attempting to live in its own little world and training only to their perceived needs and requirements.  The oversight requirements are not just the agency's own little world.  They are government-wide and worldwide today.

 

*          *          *

Excerpts: The Government Shortage of Contracting Officers. New York Times, July 5, 2007.

*          *          *

Cathy Martindale, a government contracting officer, darted between meetings about three Coast Guard ship programs, negotiating prices for proposed changes and monitoring contractors' compliance with their deals.

Martindale's job was to track the projects at the heart of the Coast Guard's $24 billion modernization project, known as Deepwater. She attended meetings about design and engineering changes for the ships -- one of which, at 418 feet, is the largest the Coast Guard has ever built. When a dispute emerged about contract terms, Martindale mediated, interpreting the terms and ensuring that companies complied.

"So I am there, always on my toes, trying to pay attention to make sure the path they are heading down is consistent with the contract," Martindale said.

But the job required 12- to 14-hour workdays. She traveled 15 days a month. And when she found that she needed to be two places at once, she decided it was time to plead for help. "I realized there's not going to be light around the corner," she said. "I could work 24/7 and would not catch up."

Martindale, 43, is among a group of procurement officers struggling to keep pace with increasing demands to oversee billions of dollars in spending by the Pentagon and civilian agencies. Although she and her colleagues play pivotal roles in the government's operation, their plight has received little attention even as the government continues to expand its reliance on private companies and embarks on increasingly complicated programs.

*          *          *

Comments on above: This contracting officer, no matter how dedicated, had no chance. The private contractor would have at least twenty equivalent people on the other side, outperforming her on every issue. That is a disaster for the taxpayers—and it was—just google the Coast Guard Deepwater Program, and get ready to be disgusted.

Think what kind of training and progressive experience a person put in this highly responsible position for the government would need. And think what real backup and support staff would be necessary. SMEs?

End Note regarding Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

a) Fraud (stealing from the government in procurements in overt or clever ways) is as old as civilization. There is a small percentage of contractors, who lack moral scruples, who do this.

Look how General U.S. Grant summed it up when he was a captain in the Mexican-American War in the 1840’s:

*          *          *

The army was but indifferently supplied with transportation. Wagons and harness could easily be supplied from the north, but mules and horses could not so readily be brought. The American traders and Mexican smugglers came to the relief. Contracts were made for mules at from eight to eleven dollars each. The smugglers furnished the animals and took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. I doubt whether they paid anything but their own time in procuring them. Such is trade; such is war. The government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated price.

*          *          *

Memoirs and Selected Letters of U.S. Grant, Library of America Ed. 1990, Pg. 57.

b) Waste and Abuse by the contractor and the government is just as old. But it is unlike fraud, which is virtually exclusively a contractor problem.  It is most often the government’s problem and creation

  • What is it when a contractor complies with the contract but produces something it knows is of little use, without fighting to get the government to terminate the procurement? Waste and Abuse.

  • And what is it when the government fails to decide exactly what item it wants but lets a cost type contract to procure the item, so it can decide later? Waste and Abuse.

  • The point here? Waste and Abuse is a two-way street, not just contractors doing it. It is not fraud, nor actionable as such. But it is rampant in the government procurement system. And extremely hard to identify and stop. Some would say it is part of having a bureaucracy—where no one—including Congress—is really responsible for anything. But that is a topic for another discussion, paper and another day.

MANAGING COST TYPE CONTRACT SITUATIONS SUCCESSFULLY IS A GOOD DEAL DIFFERENT THAN WHAT YOU READ IN THE PUBLIC PRESS!

Abstract

Additional resources in this section:

Many executives and contract managers focus on the wrong issue when structuring their approaches to cost-reimbursement contracting: the key issue is not accounting:

  1. In cost-reimbursement contracts, contractors do present their incurred performance “costs” to the other party for reimbursement. This causes contractors to immediately focus on tasks associated with how to collect, display, and present those “costs.”

  2. By contrast, in fixed priced contracts, contractors must make binding, pre-award representations to the other party for a fixed price. This forces management to focus on how to perform the promised tasks at a low cost that is within or below the fixed price.

The above distinction frequently causes commentators to stress the supreme importance of cost accounting issues on cost-reimbursement contracting.  For example, the cost-reimbursement contractor must consider:

  • What rules govern the reimbursement of specific types of costs?

  • What costs are not reimbursable?

  • What accounting structure for collecting and displaying costs must a contractor have in place? After all, that is how a contractor is paid.

Of course, cost reimbursement contracts do raise important accounting issues.  But, government agencies often only declare 1% or less of contractors incurred costs (IRS deductible business expenses) unallowable under cost-reimbursement accounting rules Source.  Therefore, there must be other more pressing issues for management’s attention, and there are.  They are very similar to the performance related issues for fixed priced contracts, with some important twists in the road.

A. Our View of The Key Issues.

A thoughtful management approach to the real issues in cost-reimbursement contracting should take priority: business, economic, and political issues should be at the forefront of all cost reimbursement contract analysis.  These issues are all driven by numerous political considerations.  Accounting is an issue for specialists, and of secondary importance. 

Cost-reimbursement contract executives and managers must focus on the following critical questions:

  • What are the customer’s expectations about performance time, and the contract’s technical requirements? Are they realistic? Can the customer’s expectations be met, and if not, how can the contractor diplomatically persuade the customer that its specific expectations are unrealistic?

  • Can the company perform the work within the cost goals set forth in the contract? If not, what positions will it take when asking for increased funding? Will such requests be granted, or will the customer be mad and perhaps not provide funding, thereby effectively “terminating” the program work?

  • What overall economic and political forces are driving the customer? Does the company understand them? Are they consistent with its contract rights? Can the company effectively use such forces or turn them to its favor?

  • Why is the company performing this work? Does it have definable short-term objectives?

  • What are the long-term corporate benefits in providing such low-profit work? Has the company incorporated the resulting benefits into its corporate long-term strategic plans?

  • And, perhaps most importantly: given the high-risk technical work to be performed, at often a lower profit, has the company fully protected its right to recover all of its current performance costs? A contractor should recover all of its costs less only minor disallowances under every cost-type contract vehicle used. This cost recovery should never be doubted. This assured recovery of all costs incurred makes up in some ways for the lower profit margins and other risks inherent in cost-reimbursement jobs.

*                      *                      *

            As you can see, each of the foregoing issues has nothing to do with accounting. 

B. Government vs. Commercial Cost Reimbursement Contracts.

Making decisions in this area requires some appreciation of the modern origins of the current cost-type contract.  The performance of high dollar, large-scale, cost-reimbursement contracts has principally been done for the federal government.  It buys over $600 billion in supplies and services yearly, and a significant portion of that dollar volume is done on a cost-reimbursement contract basis. 

Since World War II, this massive procurement activity has led the federal government to develop detailed procedures on how to administer cost-reimbursement contracts.  More importantly, it has given federal contractors a 60-year opportunity to test those procedures and learn the methods to deal with reasonable and unreasonable actions by the government under such contracts.

C. The Pure Commercial Connection

Today it is not unusual to see many large and risk prone commercial contracts, including those for power plants, production facilities, environmental remediation projects, or other large commercial construction, supply, and service contracts, being performed on a cost-reimbursement basis.  This occurs in purely commercial contract settings, as well as in situations that will eventually involve government funding obligations.

As examined below, there are reasons – largely political (or politically correct) – for the performance of this cost-reimbursement contracting. 

Many of the business and political issues and responses discussed herein are similar to commercial, government, subcontract, or cost-reimbursement contracting.  Such similarities are of course subject to the presence of specialized terms in individual contracts that can, and do at times, change the rules discussed in these materials.  Be alert for such specialized contractual terms that may alter expectations. 

Lessons learned from the performance of cost-reimbursement contracts with the federal government provide commercial contractors with a “leg up” in determining how a commercial customer (or government prime contractor) will react under various circumstances during performance. 

Remember that some of your counterparts in the government or commercial procurement side (or even in your own company) may not yet grasp many of the points explored in this text.  These issues often need to be explained to such individuals in a professional, diplomatic fashion.

D. The Uniqueness of the Cost-Reimbursement Contract.

One of the most difficult problems that company management and Government personnel initially face is distinguishing between fixed priced and cost-reimbursement contract performance obligations. 

Again, this does not mean simply identifying and accounting for allowable job costs. It does include the identification of the obligation of a party to proceed with cost-reimbursement work versus fixed priced work at various points during performance:   

  • When must a company spend its own funds?

  • What if technical results from a contractor’s performance are unacceptable?

  • When should the company wait for Government funding?

  • What are the political forces driving all of these decisions?

1. The “Labeling” of Contracts - A Caution.

Unfortunately, distinguishing between cost-type and fixed priced contract performance obligations is further complicated by the fact that the terms of the parties’ original contract documents are often unclear in defining each parties obligations, as well as unclear in stating whether the contract is of the cost-reimbursement type or not. 

The contract type “block” on the front page of the contract on this point should definitely not be relied upon. 

2. Cost-Type Contract Scope of Coverage.

The following issues, discussed below, are relevant in examining a cost type contract’s scope of coverage:

  • What are the parties’ essential performance obligations under a cost-reimbursement contract?

  • How are these different from a fixed price contract?

  • Are some contracts unclear as to whether obligations are really fixed priced or cost-reimbursement? (Yes, often!)

  • Is there a relationship between the type of specifications used in the contract, and determining whether a fixed priced or cost-reimbursement contract is actually involved? (Yes!)

E. The Politics of It All.

Two dictionary explanations of the term “political” and “politics” set out the correct frame of reference for our analysis:

  • “Prudently or artfully contrived; expedient, as a plan, action, remark, etc.”

  • “Factional scheming for power.”

[Webster’s New World Dictionary, 2d College Ed. 1974 & paperback Ed. 1990]

There is nothing at all wrong with utilizing political approaches to contract issues. And, it is wrong to ignore the fact that politics do exist and even control the outcome of many contract performance situations. To ignore such influences would be extraordinarily unrealistic and contrary to a company’s business interests.

Often “politically correct” statements and contract approaches, which can be disingenuous, compound the difficulty in understanding what is really happening during contract performance.

F. The Federal Acquisition Regulations.

The Federal Acquisition Regulations contain generalized guidance on when federal government agencies should use cost type contracts:

Cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable for use only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract. [48 C.F.R. 16.301-2]

These regulations focus on using cost-type contracts for complex requirements that are not capable of being priced with adequate certainty.  This is a good and operative goal.

There are many contract professionals who accept these goals at face value. We believe that a more searching examination is in order: For example, why were these regulations written, and what issues are underlying these directives?

However, do not lose sight of the overall positive advantages to both sides in using cost-type contracts. With proper administration, there should be:

1. Virtually No Disputes.

All effort should be focused on obtaining the result that the government desires – costs expended within reason are not an issue.

2. Greater Flexibility in Pursuit of Contract Goals.

There is no need to “establish” a contract “position” as to who is responsible for paying for “extra work” under the contract. All work done is paid for. All reasonable work and approaches can be pursued.

3. Partnership With Your Customer.

As all work is paid for the customer and contract personnel can work as a team on all issues. Both sides often have much to contribute to ensure that work is successfully performed. Knowing that all costs are reimbursable encourages openness and the sharing of data, approaches, and limitations.

G. Cost-Reimbursement Contracting vs. Fixed Priced Contracting.

A true cost-reimbursement contract is conceptually difficult for many people to accept.  This is particularly true for executives and managers of prime contractors, vendors, or the federal agency involved (the party placing the contract). 

So, what performance is properly expected from the contractor?   And, at what cost?

1. Essential Duties.

Reduced to its most simplistic form, a cost-reimbursement contract obligates the contractor to:

a. expend funds for the other party;

b. perform that expenditure in a reasonably competent fashion; and

c. attempt (only attempt) to obtain a designated result through the expenditure.

It is nothing more.  It is simply a “best efforts” undertaking by the performing party with no guarantees, and often no precise performance standards.  As you can see, this is very confusing for both sides when debating a contractor’s performance results for a difficult, and often an ill-defined technical task.

2. Reasonable Competence in Performance.

The assumption behind a cost-reimbursement contract is that the agency’s/buyer’s money will be spent competently, although the case law indicates that even that is not a particularly strong requirement.  The cost reimbursement contractor is paid for routine scrap, rework, mistakes, errors, and other acts of simple worker negligence. 

Cost reimbursement should be in doubt only when performance problems approach gross negligence.  And, these issues are virtually never formally decided because the politics of the situation often demand a quick trade-off and the prompt resolution of performance disputes.

3. Case Law Summary – Government and Commercial.

In the existing case law discussing cost type contracts, many cases allow the reimbursement of all costs incurred in the manufacturing of commercial goods, or in the construction of homes or buildings, etc. 

These cases often define “cost-plus” commercial contracts as those requiring the reimbursement of all costs spent during the term of the contract to the seller. There are also government contract decisions that are similarly favorable to “sellers” or prime contractors.

Absent express contract language to the contrary, the costs of rework, extra work, the correction of defective specifications, and other similar costs, are reimbursable as direct costs under cost-type contracts. 

The courts have held that the risk that such “extra” costs will be encountered is generally allocated to the buyer in cost-reimbursement contracts.  Examples of commercial cases so defining the burden of such risks associated with “cost-plus” contracts include the following:

  • Continental Copper & Steel Industries v. Bloom, 96 A.2d 75, 139 Conn. 700 (1953);

  • Midwest Environmental Consulting & Remediation Services, Inc. v. Peoples Bank of Bloomington, 620 N.E. 2d 469, 251 Ill. App. 256 (1993);

  • Grothe v. Erickson, 59 N.W.2d 368, 157 Neb. 248 (1953); and

  • Finn v. Krumroy Construction Co., 589 N.E.2d 58, 68 Ohio App. 3d 480 (1990).

The decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 295, 16 FPD 14 (1997) is one example of a government contract case that discusses the differing contractual obligations with respect to fixed priced contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts. In describing the “best efforts” standard of cost reimbursement contracting the Court stated as follows:

Contractual duties differ markedly between fixed-price contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts. The "best efforts" standard summarizes the. . . basic nature of the cost-reimbursement contract. .Unlike a fixed-price contract, under which the contractor is obligated to deliver the material or service for the stated price, a cost-reimbursement contract merely requires the contractor to use its best efforts to provide the goods or services at the stated price.

If despite its best efforts, the contractor cannot meet the contractual requirements, the government has obtained precisely what it bargained for, namely, the contractor's best efforts.   The contractor, therefore, is entitled to receive or retain its costs for what it has done.   The government's only right is to the product or services, plans, and equipment for which the contractor was or will be paid under the contract.  .  .  General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 229 Ct.Cl. 399, 410-411, 671 F.2d 474 (1982) (dicta).   Thus, the focus of a cost-reimbursement contract is contractor input, not output.

There is also a fine article written by Ralph Nash in the May 1966 George Washington Law Review at p. 693, entitled, “Risk Allocation in Government Contracts,” which anyone examining this particular issue should review.

4. Fee Alteration Issues.

Coupled with the foregoing performance obligations, the cost-reimbursement contract often contains very broad statements of work to be accomplished.  These should not affect cost recovery, but can sometimes affect fee recovery. 

To recover more fee on a cost-type contract, a contractor must show that the government required work in addition to the original “scope” of the contract.  The contract’s “scope” is often very broadly stated, and therefore broad coverage requires broad work effort by the contractor.  It is thus difficult for the contractor to argue that the work being required by the customer is beyond the original “scope” previously agreed to when the contract was awarded. 

As a practical matter, this is the only way to receive more fee – i.e., to argue that “constructive” changes to the original work scope are being ordered.   It can be done, but it is often difficult.

Again, in a cost-reimbursement contract, the contractor should be recovering all of its costs (less minor disallowances).  Accordingly, only the amount of the fee should be at risk during contract performance. There should never be “cost claims for extra work” on cost-type contracts.  Only extra fee disputes should occur. Stated more bluntly: only profit/fee (say 6% to 10%) should be at risk – never full cost recovery.

The contractor should also never assume that its unilateral decision to expend more costs will mean it will recover more fee: under the terms of most cost-reimbursement contracts, the expenditure of more costs effectively results in a reduced fee.  More cost also irritates the government customer because it must pay more. 

Finally, from a business point of view, more cost (with no increased fee) means at least an erosion of margin on the job.  This has negative investor implications and presents future bidding/proposal problems for the contractor with the same customer on a new or follow-on contract. 

5. Work Stoppage.

The most surprising thing about a cost-reimbursement contract to many executives and managers is that a contractor – the prime, subcontractor, or the seller - has an absolute right; indeed some would say an obligation to stop work as it approaches the full expenditure of funding that has been applied to the contract.

(We say “applied to the contract” to avoid terms such as “allocated,” “partially or fully funded,” “incrementally funded”, and the like, all of which are terms of art, which may or may not have significance depending upon the particular contract clause used.)

The obligation of the contractor to stop work - or have more funds applied to the contract to continue work - is an essential part of the cost reimbursement bargain between the parties.  It is the only leverage point the contract provides to the contractor, yet most contractors are in a muddle about how to use this most important tool.

a. Source of Right to Stop Work.

The right to stop work comes from the contract and the FAR. Consider the following language from the government’s regulations (FAR § 32.704) implementing the applicable clauses:

(a)(1) When a contract contains the clause at 52.232-20, Limitation of Cost; 52.232-21, Limitation of Cost (Facilities); or 52.232-22, Limitation of Funds, the contracting officer, upon learning that the contractor is approaching the estimated cost of the contract or the limit of the funds allotted, shall promptly obtain funding and programming information pertinent to the contract’s continuation and notify the contractor in writing that –

*                      *                      *

(iv)(A) The Government is considering whether to allot additional funds or increase the estimated cost, (B) the contractor is entitled by the contract terms to stop work when the funding or cost limit is reached, and (C) any work beyond the funding or cost limit will be at the contractor’s risk. 

Is there anything unclear about the underlined language above?  Absolutely not!  Commercial cost-reimbursement contracts contain (or should contain) similar language.  The contractor must have a corporate strategy for using this stop-work right in a professional, even-handed fashion.  This is the contractor’s most important leverage point in contract performance/funding issues.

b. Notice of Overrun.

Note also that the Limitation of Cost Clause, FAR § 52.232.20, and the Limitation of Funds Clause, FAR § 52.232-22, require that a contractor provide advance notice to the government agency (buyer) that an overrun is likely, as well as sixty days advance notice before a contractor’s funds are seventy-five percent expended. 

These notice issues are not something to be ignored by contractors until the last minute. They present important opportunities to educate the customer concerning major progress on the program, and why the addition of funding is in the government’s interests (as well as the contractor’s).

c. Contractors Who Ignore This Clause.

There are hundreds of decided cases in which the contractor ignored the clause language, discussed above, and actually exceeded the cost limit.  The government then, for whatever reason, did not add funding to the contract.  Contractors lose almost all of these cases.

Of course, the government agency can waive – after-the-fact – the requirements of the clause. But, can your company take the risk that it may not?  The answer is no, in almost all instances.

Some major weapons systems contractors with large amounts of cost-type work for the same agency might consider a one to three-month lapse in funding tolerable (they actually do this).  But, even they will tell you it is risky business. Their business people lose sleep over whether the agency will really catch-up on the funding.  The government agency has no obligation to do so: it may justifiably let funding lapse. The program/contract dies at that point.

6. Summary.

a. Contrast to Fixed Price Contract.

Note how completely the foregoing differs from what you know about fixed priced contracts.  There, a contractor agrees to a fixed price, and is expected to complete the work no matter what it costs.  If they spend less to complete, the company gets to keep the added profit.  The contrast to cost-reimbursement obligations is startling. 

b. Summary re Cost-Reimbursement Contract Obligations.

Some individuals would say that a cost-reimbursement contract is nothing more than an obligation to make reasonable expenditures of the government’s (or other party’s) money. When the money is about to run out, give notice, and remember to stop work until additional funds are added to the contract. 

This may be correct legally and contractually.  However, it totally ignores the politics and economics of the situation, which we discuss next.

H. Areas of Management Challenge in Cost-Reimbursement Contracts.

As defined above, situations are “political” when they are “artfully contrived” or involve “expedient action”. Such political approaches are certainly in evidence in the award and performance of a cost-type contract, and the decision to add or not add more funding.

This award and performance are taking place to artfully obscure what may be the real concerns and the real objectives of the parties. The cost-type contract may be “expedient” or “artful” to accomplish something. That may not be the publicly stated reasons behind the use of a cost-type contract, nor may it necessarily be the best way to proceed.

Difficult political and economic issues often underlie the real life situations in which a cost-reimbursement contract is awarded and performed.  For one thing, these political and economic issues tend to totally stand the contractor’s legal/contractual rights on its head. 

For example, if a contractor insists on getting more money added to the contract or being paid for non-compliant work, the agency may well cancel the contract.  The agency has every right to do so.  The contractor has no remedies. It gets paid for what it spent, and the contract simply ends.

Thus, the parties start performance at what is really a standoff.  This stand-off continues until the work is completed or the contract is canceled: ask for more money – the government might give it – or might cancel the contract and/or the program.  It may all depend on the current “appearance” of the situation, contract performance, and other related issues.

And, the government knows it holds the funds.  Therefore, it may ask the contractor for an infinite number of “free things” before it commits to adding more funds.  Many contractors will agree to provide some or all of these extra “things” at no cost. 

What happened to the contractor’s absolute right to more funds as discussed in earlier sections?  It has been taken over and trumped by the current politics of the situation.

As discussed below, some contractors may perform so poorly or their situation may be so precarious, that it needs to provide services or items for “free” simply to survive.  The upcoming battle over further funding of the F-35 program is a good example that bears watching.

1. Political Issues Forcing the Award of Cost-Reimbursement Contracts.

In the first place, there was a reason that a cost-reimbursement contract was awarded, and that generally has political bases.  The cost- type contract was not necessarily awarded because it was the “best” way to proceed. Contractors need to remember this in developing their performance plans. 

Cost-reimbursement contracts are often awarded because:

  • The agency and the contractor, together or separately, are unsure or indeed completely insecure about whether they have adequate specifications or technology in hand to do the work on a fixed price basis. By itself, this is a perfectly appropriate reason to use a cost-type contract. But often there is more at issue.

  • The failure of performance on a fixed priced contract, leading to a default termination or a termination for convenience, is politically embarrassing to the agency and the contractor. The agency may lose future funding. The contractor may lose future business. Cost-type contracting removes these issues.

  • The parties may not understand the total work scope (unexpected occurrences are likely) well enough to commit to a fixed priced job. That is an appropriate reason to use a cost type contract. But, repeatedly adding funds by modifications to a fixed priced contract, through the use of change orders for “unexpected occurrences”, presents the political embarrassment that neither the agency nor the contractor can manage the project. The cost -type contract largely eliminates this.

  • Only limited funds are now available, but more are expected. The placement of the cost-type contract is an opportunity for the agency and contractor to show some progress on a project, even though it may be small.

  • Outside political forces (and events) are pressing for the work to proceed very rapidly, without detailed planning. Something must be done. If it is not, the media or Congress – or both – will be screaming!

  • There is absolutely no time to do the procurement mechanics of a fixed priced contract; money must be applied to the tasks simply to get work started (or completed if a larger task – i.e., Gulf War(s)/Afghanistan Campaign, Hurricane Relief Efforts, etc.). It is embarrassing not to accomplish something because more planning is needed (even to get it done correctly!).

All of the above issues seldom operate alone – rather they can often interact to force the utilization of a cost-reimbursement contract.

It is almost always these types of political and economic issues that force the award of a cost-reimbursement contract.  Although agency regulations spell out when each type of contract should be used, the real decision is often politically motivated.  It is, therefore, no surprise that politics continually affect whether the contract will continue or end during its performance stage. Both parties to the contract make statements that are simply “expedient”. They may not be the real reasons behind the actions taken.

 2. Political Issues in Performance.

As would be expected, the award of the cost-reimbursement contract hardly ends the politics of the situation.  “Expedient” action and position taking continue into performance: while the obligations to discontinue performance when funding is no longer available may be perfectly clear, the exact opposite may occur during real life performance stages:

  • The agency may pressure the contractor as follows: if the contractor does not meet its original budget for costs expended, the program will be canceled or curtailed. The agency has the right to do this. But, the budget may have been unrealistically low or impacted by later government actions. It does not matter – the agency may cancel.

  • The agency may say it does not have sufficient funding for the next three months, but it expects to get additional funding. Will the contractor proceed without funds with the assurance that additional funds will be paid if received? It is common to even record a contract modification that funds will be paid if received (anticipatory cost clause). Why doesn’t the agency have funds? This often results from its lack of planning, or the failure to deal with Congress in a timely fashion. In effect, this becomes the contractor’s problem.

  • The contractor may be pressed to cost share in overruns, i.e. not bill for all of its costs, and assume certain tasks on its own account. Does this seem right when the contractor was originally promised full cost-reimbursement?

  • The contractor may be pressed to pay itself for correcting work on units that are deemed “unsatisfactory”. Cost-type contracts pay for ordinary deficiencies. Why is the bargain being changed after award?

  • The contractor may be pressed to pay for performance “redeeming” or “improvement” features out of its own pocket. The contract does not require this. But, the contractor’s performance may have been embarrassingly bad and the agency may also have been publicly embarrassed. The media or Congress is screaming about why this contractor is being paid anything!

  • This list goes on and on. There is no limit to what the agency may ask for. There is no limit as to how a contractor may respond – rationally or irrationally.

3. Public Perceptions Are Often Wrong About Cost Reimbursement Contracts.

Neither the media nor the public understands why a cost-type contract is being utilized or its obligations. The following specific and real- world examples are helpful in showing the confusion that often exists in understanding cost-type contracts.

a. Rebuilding Iraq Example.

The excerpts that follow are from respected news sources in June 2003, shortly after the first major cost-type contracts to rebuild Iraq were awarded.  Note that the public, including Congress and the news media, seemed surprised and confused by the use of cost- type contracts. 

Their misunderstanding of existing contract management and political issues are profound, as the discussion below shows.  Think of how you would cut through this confusion if you needed to make an upper management presentation on these issues:

*                      *                      *

Nobody knows how much it will ultimately cost to fix Iraq.  In that climate of uncertainty, the U.S. Agency for International Development opted for a cost-plus, fixed-fee deal - a contract often used by governments to exert some control over costs and give the contractor incentive to engage in open-ended work.

*                      *                      *

But within such limits, there is potential for abuse since the contractor has no incentive to contain expenses.  Most cost-plus deals stipulate a certain amount for the jobs performed, which may include equipment, labor, transportation, legal costs, clerical support and so on - all under the very general category of “overhead.”  But overhead can be inflated to increase profits.  Imagine that a contractor needs to buy 10 bulldozers or 1,000 PCs to finish a job.  Should the cost be laid to the first customer or amortized over several jobs?  This kind of accounting dispute says Michael Garvin, a professor of civil engineering at Columbia University, often happens in cost-plus deals.

*                      *                      *

Vardi, Desert Storm, Forbes, June 23, 2003, p. 66 (Discussing Bechtel’s Iraqi Contract.)

Let us examine the foregoing quote and see what makes sense and what does not:

1. The first paragraph is a good overview of why cost-type, fixed fee contracts are used, but the reason for their use is not to “exert some control over costs…”

2. The analysis then completely falls apart in the second paragraph:

  • Contrary to the article, the contractor always has an incentive to control costs - if it does not, there may be no future funding or follow-on contracts.

  • Cost-type contracts often do not “stipulate a certain amount for the job to be performed…” That would be a fixed price contract.

  • While “overhead” calculations can be a problem, the government’s accounting rules, IRS depreciation standards, and trade association publications generally resolve such issues as the time period for the depreciation of equipment.

  • The type of equipment listed in the article will often be directly charged for a cost-type contract such as this. Also, the PCs will be useless after several years on the contract. The bulldozers may have some residual value, which can be readily accounted for under existing accounting rules.

  • The article assumes that if an error is made, the government cannot later get part of its payments back once a contractor has been paid. We know the government can almost always get its money back.

  • There is plenty of room for abuse under cost-type contracts - but the big money is not in overhead “inflation”. Remember the 1% overall disallowance rate?

  • The biggest potential for abuse is inefficiency in spending direct labor (and associated overhead) to do tasks that do not need to be done, or that could have been done with say one-third the hours if planned properly. Both contractors and government agencies can be involved in such abuse.

*                      *                      *

Now to show you how far away from fact reporting on cost reimbursement can go, considering the following quote:

*                      *                      *

The technical term of Logcap (Logistics Civil Augmentation Program) is “cost-reimbursement, indefinite quantity,” or “cost-plus,” meaning KBR spends whatever it believes necessary to get a job done, then adds from 1 to 9 percent as profit.  There’s practically no limit on how lucrative Logcap can be, and as the awarding of the Iraqi oil-field contract - by KBR, to KBR - demonstrates, Logcap can become a generator of yet more contracts.  Nothing like it exists elsewhere in government.  That KBR wrote the oil-field plan wasn’t considered by the Army a disqualifying conflict of interest - in fact, just the opposite.

*                      *                      *

Baum, Nation Builders for Hire, New York Times Magazine, June 22, 2003, p. 34 (discussing Kellogg Brown & Root’s Iraq oil field contract with the U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers).

This seemed to be written to tear down cost-type contracting and the contractor involved, as opposed to giving a more even-handed analysis:

  • The statement - “meaning KBR spends whatever it believes necessary to get the job done…” [emphasis added] - shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the topics already reviewed.

  • The statement “there’s practically no limit on how lucrative Logcap can be…,” would be disputed by most reputable contractors. There are numerous limitations, as these materials show, plus a “1 to 9” profit would hardly impress most contractors, government or commercial.

  • The statements that “Logcap can become a generator of yet more contracts” and “[n]othing like it exists elsewhere in government” simply show a lack of understanding. Every contractor’s performance should generate some percentage of follow-on contracts - or it would be out of business.

  • And, finally the statement “That KBR wrote the oil-field plan wasn’t considered by the Army a disqualifying conflict of interest…” shows a lack of knowledge as to Organizational Conflict Regulations. This situation is not a conflict for a systems developer and has not been for years under the long established government-wide procurement rules.

*                      *                      *

Once again, the media’s lack of information, and desire to criticize without the facts (political objectives?) misses the real points that need public oversight: the actual selection of cost-type work, the management of that work, and the efficiency in performance by both the government agency and the contractor.  These are the areas that urgently need attention and public debate. They receive little or none.

b.        Aerospace Example:

Press reports of Lockheed’s problems with an air defense system under development also show serious management and political problems in a real world setting. We have underlined the three most important issues to focus on in the following news report. 

Is this a cost-reimbursement contract issue, a management issue, a political issue, or all of the above?  Is what Lockheed is doing wise?

Lockheed—Pentagon Agreement is Revised.  New York Times, Wednesday, July 29, 1998, p. D8.

WASHINGTON, July 28 (Bloomberg News) – The Lockheed Martin Corporation agreed today to pay the Defense Department up to $75 million if failures continue in tests of an antimissile system, Lockheed, and the Government said.

The agreement includes a provision for the Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space to win back a portion of any fees for missile failures.

The Theater High Altitude Area Defense System, known as THAAD, has failed five times to intercept a ballistic missile in tests, though portions of the system have performed well in flight tests.

Lockheed has not lost money because of the failures because the contract required the Pentagon to pay for any failures.  That arrangement ends with the new agreement.

The agreement comes as several Congressional committees have made deep cuts in President Clinton’s $822 million fiscal year 1999 request for THAAD’s development.  Congress is likely to direct the Pentagon to bring in a second contractor if the failures continue.

THAAD is to be a mobile system of missile batteries and ground radar designed to destroy short-range ballistic missiles.

The top THAAD subcontractors are the Raytheon Company, which makes the ground radar, and TRW, Inc., which is making the communications system.

Our response to the foregoing is as follows:

  • This is a cost-reimbursement contract; Lockheed has been paid for prior failures. That is proper; that is why this is a cost-reimbursement contract in the first place: because of the extraordinary risk of performance failure. The risk is too large for the contractor to bear cost-wise.

  • But, now political issues have arisen – the agency is under media and congressional pressure. It will not continue the program unless Lockheed agrees to downward adjustments in cost recovery (capped at $75 million downward) if there are more failures. (The government is in effect converting the contract to a partially fixed price undertaking. Or, some would say, cost-type, but with a fixed loss.)

  • And, the agency is threatening to bring in a second contractor to “fix” the failures (a common tactic): you will lose this contract/program unless you agree to the agency’s demands.

  • The agency has thus exercised its contractual and political rights to stop the program unless….

  • Lockheed has wisely responded with a political (not a contract) solution – we will pay for the costs for any more failures up to $75 million and then ...

  • This has proven to be a smart move for Lockheed… The program continued.

  • There is always a “then”…and “a next” negotiation in situations such as this. It never ends unless performance significantly improves or the job is finally finished.

Conclusion

We have now come full circle.  The mechanics of what is written in a cost-reimbursement contract, and how the contract is supposed to operate, may, as a practical matter, have nothing to do with the pressure and obligations that company management feels in terms of performance and cost obligations because of politics (and their company’s economic situation).

This is a critical distinction to understand in order to properly manage a cost-reimbursement contract for any party to it: government or commercial, prime or subcontract, government official or owner.  The contract at some point means nothing; politics and the ability to negotiate mean everything.

We are not raising this as a right or wrong issue.  We are simply raising it so that you understand that the politics of a situation may be completely different than the contractual and legal obligations of a situation.

Company management and agency personnel need to know what their contractual and legal obligations are so they can decide whether they want to let politics and economics override their right to stop performance and/or their ability to seek additional funding.  Management can legally say in almost all cases – no funding, no work.  That is often the wrong political and economic decision. 

Lockheed recognized that in the above factual situation, and wisely negotiated a “politically correct” resolution to save its program.  By contrast, the Iraq contractors appear to have simply ignored criticism as to their contracts.  Doing nothing is always an attractive alternative when responding would simply make matters worse.

ALTERING YOUR GOVERNMENT CONTRACT’S PRICE OR SCHEDULE: HOW IT IS DONE THROUGH CLAIMS AND REA’s: IT GETS MORE COMPLEX AND CONFUSING EACH YEAR

Abstract

Additional Resources in this Section:

Contractors draft and submit Requests for Equitable Adjustments (REA’s) and "claim" documents to persuade the other contracting parties (often Government agencies) that an adjustment to the contract is needed, due to events occurring after award and generally during performance. Such adjustments may consist of either an increase or decrease to the contract price or an adjustment to other terms and conditions—such as schedule.

The utilization of the so-called REA and “claims process”, operating in conjunction with various other contract provisions, is often the only way for contractors or Government agencies to assert their contractual rights with respect to alterations to contract price, delivery schedule, quality, etc. after contract performance starts.

This ability to make these “adjustments” to the contract after award is obviously extraordinarily important to the contractor and the Government agency involved.  The techniques, strategies, and consequences for both sides are perhaps the most critical subjects in all of contract administration.  And they are not easily understood.  Case law makes them more complex with each passing year.

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO WHY REAS AND CLAIMS OCCUR – PREDICTING AND PREVENTING THEM.

There are many interrelated reasons why REAs and claims occur under Government contracts and other contracts. Surprisingly, many contract REAs and claims are not founded initially upon legal or contractual bases. Rather, a large number of such adjustment requests stem initially from underlying political and economic objectives. Others simply arise due to poor communications and/or poor management by both parties to the contract. 

Such "root causes" of REAs and claims must be identified before a proper analysis for REA and claims preparation and defense can be undertaken.  If Government officials do not understand the motivation behind a contractor’s REA and claim submission, it will be much more difficult, if not impossible to deal with and to construct mechanisms to prevent them in the future. This holds true for contractors as well in trying to maximize their recoveries.

This first chapter of the text serves as an introduction to the preparation and defense of REAs and claims. We hope it is helpful to you.

Additional detailed discussion exploring the practical, day-to-day issues and techniques that contractors and Government officials must deal with in preparing and/or defending REAs and claims are set forth in the remainder of the materials after this Chapter 1. That is currently 500 pages of materials in “beta” draft format as we finish the text and update and add new materials.  We will honor email requests for this beta draft material addressed to dch@dcholmes.com

CASELAW

While this text contains significant case law discussion, such analysis is intended to assist contractors and Government officials in determining how to deal with REA and claims issues so as to protect themselves legally in the event litigation results.  This text does not attempt to comprehensively analyze each and every conceivable legal basis for, and defenses of, REAs and claims in Government contracts.  To perform such an analysis competently would fill many volumes of text.

Rather, this presentation concentrates on providing real-world direction in successfully concluding the REA and claims process from the time the REA or claim is first identified up until the time of final resolution. This includes discussions related to critical decision points, techniques, approaches, forms, negotiating tactics, and related issues involved in preparing and defending REAs and claims. 

SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS AND PATTERNS

Much of the analysis provided here is subjective -- it is simply based upon the combined experience of the author and his law firm in doing this type of work for over 49 years.  This experience gives rise to a key assumption: REAs and claims most often occur in very predictable patterns and circumstances under federal contracts (and for that matter state and local contracts, as well as subcontracts related thereto and commercial contracts).  

Understanding and recognizing such patterns allows contractors and Government officials to respond to particular REA and claim issues in a more effective and efficient manner.  This holds true for both the presentation to recover and the defense to such actions.

LIMITED OPTIONS OF CONTRACTORS

Once a REA or claim has “occurred”, prevention techniques are more limited.  All of these issues and techniques -- dealing with situations before and after the development of actual "claims" -- will be explored in detail in this text.  Criticism of management approaches by both Government agencies and contractors during the claims process is necessarily included -- if you do not see the mistakes that others have made, you will invariably repeat them!

The preparation and defense of Government contract REAs and claims is a complex subject, replete with subjective opinions and views.  It is absolutely necessary to attempt to classify, breakdown, streamline, and recognize correct standards, and "out of the box" analysis and responses to such difficult performance circumstances. 

The framework and origins of REAs and claims and the standard terminology utilized during the claims process must also be understood first. Where did all of this come from?

II. INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF TERMINOLOGY TO REAS AND CLAIMS PREPARATION AND DEFENSE.


Using appropriate terminology (and understanding its limitations and origins) is important in most areas -- in the Federal REA and claims area such knowledge is imperative:

  • Statutes and regulations provide initial guidance in many cases.

  • Courts and Boards of Contract Appeals often further interpret particular terminology.

  • In a number of areas, there are no set meanings for terms. For example, the term “REA” means different things to different people at different times.

  • Yet additional terms are defined according to the parties’ past practices in prior contracts, or customary meanings within certain industries.

Individuals must get a grip on these principle terms utilized.  What terms have defined meanings?  Which terms are simply slang or a kind of term of art?  What terms are being misused, thus preventing future dangerous situations with respect to contractual undertakings?

FRAUD, WASTE ABUSE ISSUES

Remember that virtually all activity in the federal Government contracting arena is effectively policed by ongoing initiatives under fraud, waste, and abuse statutes. A serious misstatement in a REA or claim document submitted to a Government agency seeking a payment can be specifically targeted for investigation and/or civil or criminal prosecution. 

Be careful and precise with the terminology used.  Contractors must ensure complete and competent communication with the other side, particularly their Government customer(s), about exactly what is being proposed or claimed, and what the underlying elements behind such claims mean in particular contexts.    

Note that the terms “REA” and "claim" have already been defined in a broad, open-ended fashion.  Contracting parties tend to refer to the adjustment of Government contract terms, including price, as part of the "claims" process.  In fact, this is not technically correct.  While perhaps a somewhat useful shorthand approach, such a broad definition oversimplifies the situation, as seen below.

III. THE CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT (CDA) MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS.

1. CONTRACTOR CLAIMS; REAS; DISPUTES - UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN (A) CLAIMS, (B) REQUESTS FOR EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENTS (REAS), AND (C) ROUTINE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS.

It is very important for contractors and Government officials to have a working knowledge of these three reference terms. It is even more important to understand the conceptual framework that each entails in the claims and litigation area. 

Remember, at the Federal contract level, no litigation can be commenced in most cases by either the prime contractor or the federal Government, until a “claim” has been presented to the party against whom the litigation is to occur.  Most often a “final decision” must also be issued by a Contracting Officer, or 60 days elapse after submittal.

This is especially important given that contracting parties often use these terms incorrectly, or in a casual manner that does not fully reflect their actual intentions.

For the purposes of this text, these and other similar terms are utilized as follows:

a. A ROUTINE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION ACTION AND "CONVERSION". 

There are thousands of “routine contract administration actions" that take place every day, in every Government agency doing procurement work, throughout the United States and the world. 

For example, a contract price may be increased by a formal change order. Or, a contract price may be decreased as the result of a deviation request. 

A Contracting Officer may find that a contractor has failed to perform all of the items specified under its janitorial contract, and will therefore reduce the contract price under the contract’s Inspection Clause. The contractor does not formally object.

These are all routine contract administration actions, and the legislative and regulatory history of the Contract Disputes Act uses exactly this term.  These are simply activities that take place every day which alter and adjust a contract price, delivery schedule, or other contract terms.  There is no REA or claim involved in such situations.  There is no litigation.

This activity takes place and is routinely dealt with inside the agency using ordinary forms and simple discussions between the parties to the contract if necessary.

CONTRACTOR DECISION MAKING

Yet, every one of these routine contract administration actions can become a REA or claim or litigation depending on whether the parties are able to resolve their differences. Another important point is the fact that one party, generally the contractor because of the way the CDA is drafted, must unilaterally decide when something is or becomes a REA or a claim or litigation.

Contractors make such decisions and designations – as REA or claim -- and they must determine how to make them stick.  Generally, the Government cannot control or prevent something from becoming a REA or a claim.  It is only the contractor’s decision.

CONVERSION

The "conversion” of a routine contract administrative action into a REA or claim must be treated as a procedurally precise issue. While a procedural foul-up generally is no longer fatal, it can cost the contractor a good deal of time in getting paid.

We will explore this interrelationship between routine contract actions, REAs, claims, and litigation, and"conversion" techniques below.

B. REQUESTS FOR EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT (REAS).

WHAT IS IT?    

The Changes Clause (and a number of other clauses in federal Government contracts) states that if the contractor’s work is altered, he receives "an equitable adjustment" in contract price and/or delivery schedule.  This is the derivative of the term “request for equitable adjustment": a contractor is simply making a written request to the Contracting Officer for something he believes he is entitled to -- an equitable adjustment under a contract clause. 

THE FAR

There is no requirement in the FAR for how to handle a REA, no time schedule for doing so, and no penalties if the Contracting Officer either chooses to ignore the REA or does not fairly decide the request.  There is likewise no form prescribed in the FAR.  And, perhaps most surprisingly, there is nothing the contractor can do to force the Contracting Officer to deal with its request as a REA. 

THE SUBMITTAL

The REA may be looked upon as something less formal than a Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”) claim (discussed below), but somewhat more formal than a routine contract administration action (which should resolve itself in most instances).  In the case of the REA, the contractor must submit its request in writing -- a simple letter is often all that is required.  Such a document should point out to the Government Contracting Officer that an adjustment to the contract price, delivery schedule, or another term(s), is required by various facts or circumstances.

The contractor may be mistaken about its REA and/or the Government may reject the contractor’s request.  If these circumstances occur, the Government will deny the REA and the contractor will then have its next and last option to recover short of litigation -- filing a CDA claim with the Contracting Officer, which triggers the provisions of the CDA. Such action benefits the contractor at least procedurally.

THE USEFULNESS OF THE REA

Why do contractors submit REAs if the contractor has no control over them? There are many reasons why contractors submit REAs, some of which are logical and make perfectly good sense.  There are other REA submissions that are simply thoughtless. 

The basic reason to submit a REA is to gain an opportunity to have an informal negotiation with the Contracting Officer and/or his representatives to resolve the matter at issue early on in an effort to avoid the submission of a formal claim and future litigation that may result.  The use of REAs can be beneficial in several ways:

  • Getting Paid Quickly. REAs are often granted or allowed in whole or in part by Contracting Officers. Thus, the contractor's REA has served the useful purpose of bringing the matter to the Government Contracting Officer’s attention so that it may be dealt with in the ordinary course of business.

  • Informal. No claim and no dispute need be involved. In fact, once the REA is filed, the matter is often concluded with some routine contract administration action—a letter from the Contracting Officer directing that certain performance be taken, or that alleged extra work not be undertaken. Negotiated bilateral changes to the contract may therefore result.

  • Diplomatic Approach. There are also political reasons why submitting a REA may make sense. A REA is a request for the Contracting Officer to take action. If the REA document is drafted judiciously and avoids a lot of finger pointing, it may serve simply as a statement of factual information. The Contracting Officer then has the option to negotiate the matter before it degenerates into a greater, more-involved, dispute.

  • Agency Procedures Differ. In addition, some agencies have different ways of dealing internally with REAs compared to CDA claims. Many agency contracting officers, and their lawyers would prefer to resolve matters as REAs as compared to CDA claims. REAs often require less internal reviews, less paperwork, and less computerized reporting.

  • Learning the Agency Position. Although it is wise in many situations to begin by submitting a REA to the Contracting Officer in order to see if the matter may be resolved informally, there are times when thoughtful analysis will show that doing so will simply be a waste of time.

  • Example: Time to Convert. As an example consider the following scenario: the contractor has been performing a construction contract for the Corps of Engineers for approximately one-year. He has submitted 20 REAs dealing with various matters that have arisen on the job site which he believes sincerely warrant additional compensation. In that one-year period, the Contracting Officer has not considered, audited, or commenced negotiations on any of the REAs. The contractor now has a major 21st REA that he is prepared to submit on a high dollar value issue. Should he submit this as a REA?

Probably not -- why would the Contracting Officer treat this REA any differently than the previous 20?  This is a situation in which the normal REA negotiation process is not working.  The contractor should utilize the Contract Disputes Act to immediately convert the data he has prepared for his REA into a CDA claim.   He should also convert the pending other 20 REAs into CDA claims.

That puts the contractor in charge of at least the procedural decision-making and develops a timetable for action. We will explain these approaches below following some discussion as to the content of CDA claims.

C. CDA CLAIMS. 

The term CDA "claim" refers to a document that is filed in compliance with the requirements of the Contract Disputes Act.  We discuss below the procedural requirements for a CDA "claim". It is in most cases a mandatory prerequisite to contract litigation on any issue.

The term "claim" is frequently misused – almost all requests for increased compensation under a Government contract are referred to as "claims".  That is technically incorrect:  as seen from the above discussion, a routine contract administration action and a REA also request increased compensation, but such actions are not technically “claims”. 

In fact, a CDA “claim” is separately identifiable now that 40 years have passed since the Contract Disputes Act was enacted.  Courts and Boards have answered most, but not all, of the questions relating to exactly what a CDA “claim” means, and what rights it gives a contractor.

We now examine CDA details.

2. THE CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT OF 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 601, ET.SEQ.; ALSO CALLED “CDA”, “DISPUTES ACT”, OR THE ORIGIN OF “CLAIM CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Obviously, Government contract claims were made and submitted for a long time prior to 1978.  The CDA was enacted by Congress to introduce some certainty and procedural streamlining into the claims presentation and defense process.  It was a good attempt on Congress’s part and has largely worked as intended.  

A. ORIGINS OF CDA CREATION. 

While there are many additional elements in the CDA that are of importance to the Government and contractors, the CDA was principally created to deal with problems associated with the failure of contracting officers to timely consider claims for extra work or compensation for other similar types of additional work: 

  • Prompt Payment Problems. The CDA was passed in response to contractors’ complaints to their elected representatives over a number of years. Small-business contractors were particularly vocal. The essence of the complaints was that the Government failed to pay invoices on time (the Prompt Payment Act solved some of these problems), and also that the Government was not taking proper responsibility for increased costs occurring during contract performance that it caused.

  • Extra Work. Contractors complained that the Government was failing to act upon claims submitted for extra work that was allegedly arising from the Changes or other similar clauses. The majority of such complaints included arguments that the Government was either “ignoring” such claims for extra compensation, or that it was refusing to reimburse contractors for such claims after they were submitted.


B. BREADTH OF APPLICATION – FEDERAL AGENCIES, TYPES OF SERVICES, SUPPLIES, AND CONSTRUCTION.

The reach of the CDA is very broad indeed.  It applies to virtually all purchases of supplies, services, and construction by the federal Government.  There are a few exceptions, i.e. when non-appropriated funds are involved, or when the purchase of real estate is undertaken.  Maritime claims are also somewhat unique.

But, otherwise, the Contract Disputes Act applies at the prime contract level to virtually everything the federal Government purchases. (See also the discussion herein re: application of issues to subcontractor’s claims against primes.)

IV. DETAILED CDA CLAIM CONTENTS.

It is evident in reading the CDA itself, and applicable regulations, that a CDA claim requires little more than a REA.  In fact, in many instances, it is possible to use the same information provided in the REA to quickly generate the CDA claim.

The first step in CDA claim preparation is to understand the common elements of such a claim.

The CDA requires in effect that the contractor, at a minimum, must provide (1) a narrative statement of the basis for entitlement, (2) a sum certain that is being claimed, (3) a certification (if necessary based on the claim amount), and (4) a demand for a Contracting Officer’s final decision.            

A. WRITTEN NARRATIVE.

One must include a written narrative statement of the issues, the facts, and the resulting bases for entitlement to increased costs or other relief being sought from the Contracting Officer.  (This can be a fairly simple statement if the issue is not complex).

B. QUANTIFICATION.

One must include a  quantification of the amounts the contractor seeks from the Government is necessary.  There should be some statement of the monetary amount and hopefully some backup for how such an amount was calculated.  The contractor should also be clear as to requests for non-monetary relief – i.e. the interpretation of a particular specification (which could cost it money in the future if misapplied).

Note that the foregoing two items are exactly what one would expect to informally include in a REA to the Contracting Officer to explain the issue at hand and how the contractor arrived at its costs.

To make the foregoing two-part presentation into a CDA claim, the contractor need only add the following:

C. CDA CERTIFICATE.

AMOUNTS

For claims over $100,000, a CDA certificate as prescribed in the FAR is required. No CDA certificate is needed for claims under $100,000, although they are often requested and submitted.

WHO SIGNS THE CDA CERTIFICATE?

There was a time of significant debate and litigation over whether the correct person signed the necessary claim certificate -- i.e. over $100,000.  Many contractors felt obliged to have the President of the Company sign such certificates in order to preserve their right to recover interest and to avoid losing momentum in their claim processing procedure.

Congress changed the CDA in 1992 (P.L. 102-572, codified at 41 USC 605(c)).  This removed the requirement in effect that the President sign such certificates. The current law allows company officials to sign who are “duly authorized to bind the contractor with respect to the claim”.  FAR 33.207(e)

Most importantly, the changes made in 1992 also support the position that if there is any problem with the certificate, it can be corrected after the fact and does not result in a change to the certification date. 

This is particularly important as to interest recovery, as well as in avoiding the loss of momentum during the claims process by needing to resolve debates over procedural issues that are really inconsequential.  This allows the parties to focus on resolving issues to both sides’ satisfaction based on the facts and applicable legal principals.

D. DEMAND FOR FINAL DECISION.

While not a strict CDA requirement, contractors should demand a Contracting Officer’s final decision -- those words should, therefore, be included.

E. ADDITIONAL DETAILS RE: FORM

Again, as with REAs, there is no exact form which must be utilized in order to perfect a CDA claim.  While we are comfortable that the foregoing information and outline is sufficient, you need not follow it exactly in order to perfect a CDA claim. 

But, logic and common sense would tell you that as a minimum you should inform the Contracting Officer of the basis for entitlement, and how you quantified your requested recovery. In addition, you should include a certification and demand for a final decision.

RELAXED VIEW

The Board and Court decisions are fairly relaxed in terms of requiring the contractor to include certain specific information in its CDA claim.  Most documents that fairly notify the contracting officer of the facts surrounding the claim, and the amount requested, will be found to satisfy CDA claim requirements.

FAR DEFINITIONS

A “claim” against the Government is a term of art that has been defined in statutes and regulations, as well as in court decisions.   It is important to know what these rules are to avoid unnecessary delay or even the loss of a valid claim. 

  • FAR § 2.101 defines a “claim” as:

. . . a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract. However, a written demand or written assertion by the contractor seeking the payment of money exceeding $100,000 is not a claim under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 until certified as required by the Act. A voucher, invoice or other routine request for payment that is not in dispute when submitted is not a claim. The submission may be converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting officer as provided in 33.206(a), if it is disputed either as to liability or amount or is not acted upon in a reasonable time.

(We will talk more about vouchers and conversion below)

  • The claim document must be in writing and submitted to the Contracting Officer (“CO”).

  • The claim must contain a total sum certain, the amount that is being claimed. H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F. 3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(cost breakdown not required); and J&J Maintenance, Inc., ASBCA No. 50,894, 2000 WL 199758 (February 15, 2000).

  • A sum certain cannot be qualified. Do not use words such as “probably” to describe the amount claimed, and ensure that the amounts are internally consistent. Pevar Co. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 822 (1995) (“subject to review by auditors” inadequate); Domagala v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 149 (1993) (“monetary damages” inadequate); Southwest Marine, Inc., ASBCA No. 39472, 91-3 BCA ¶24,126 (“alternate” amounts inadequate).

  • The claim must contain a request for a final decision of the CO, and for claims over $100,000 a certification, described above, is also required.

As stated above, the Boards and Courts now tend to view these requirements more liberally, and can sometimes be met without exact compliance.  Scan-Tech Security, L.P. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 326 (2000). 

However, since the requirements are relatively simple to meet, contractors should include, in the introduction and conclusion of the claim document, the total specific amount claimed and a “request for a final decision of the Contracting Officer”.

F. OUTLINE OF CDA CLAIM REQUIREMENTS.

The following outline, used by many companies, can easily satisfy CDA claim requirements; it is also a good outline for a REA:

  • Executive summary.

  • The minimum contract requirements at issue.

  • The Government’s action or inaction that forced the contractor to do more than what the contract required.

  • A “scoping” statement containing the additional work actually performed as a result of the new Government requirements.

  • The accounting proof to support estimates or actual costs for the increased scope of work performed.

  • In appropriate claims, a legal brief stating the legal basis of entitlement.

To enhance the potential for a successful claim (or REA) settlement, the following additional support should be considered:

  • An appendix that contains all of the contract documents that are involved. It is courteous to include all of the correspondence that the contractor is relying upon so that the Government agency official reviewing the claim does not have to search for documents. The documents relied upon are all tabbed and in the claim document itself.

  • If drawings are involved, the contractor would probably want to include foldouts of the pertinent drawings so agency engineering personnel analyzing the claim do not have search for them.

  • If there are specifications or parts of the schedule at issue, those should also be included in full text.

  • If massive amounts of data are involved, some charts, summaries, or other materials analyzing and making sense out of the data is appropriate.

  • Photographs of the items at issue. The submission of a claim without some description of the item leaves the reader without a frame of reference.

  • Expert opinions. A contractor, if it has in-house experts or has taken the time to hire outside experts to evaluate its position, should give consideration to including those reports as an appendix to the claim.

  • Engineering write-ups by engineering personnel discussing technical issues. If lengthy technical dissertations are required, they should probably be included in an appendix.


G. “DISPUTES” BEFORE AND AFTER A CONTRACTING OFFICER’S FINAL DECISION. 

Is there a requirement that the parties be in "dispute" before a matter is capable of being processed as a CDA claim?  In other words, do there have to be disputes and arguments between the parties before the contractor can activate the claim by putting it in writing and demanding a final decision? 

While we do not believe there was ever any statutory requirement for doing this, Courts and Boards did for some time appear to require a dispute, as well as the satisfaction of the mechanics, in preparing a CDA claim.

That requirement has largely been eliminated because of Reflectone v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed.Cir. 1995). Cases being decided today show only an inquiry as to whether the parties have different views about the issue being decided. Indeed, contractors filing CDA claims should simply have to show that they have asked to be reimbursed for something that has not been paid.  That should be the end of it.

1. WHEN IS A CLAIM IN “DISPUTE”?

The above question led to esoteric litigation and created major practical problems for contractors.  Under prior case law, if the contractor’s entitlement to recover a specific amount requested in a claim was not “in dispute” at the time the claim was submitted, it was not a “claim”. Dawco Construction Co. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

The idea was that the Government would pay the undisputed amount in a reasonable time.  That did not always occur. 

If the Government Agency unreasonably delayed in deciding entitlement or amount, Government contractors were forced into making the agency enter into an “impasse” in negotiations to create a “dispute” in order to have a “claim”.  That meant contractors had to file two claims—initially when there was no “dispute”, and then a second time after an “impasse”. 

That was the only way to be certain that contractor’s appeal rights could be exercised without the risk of going to a Board or Court and having the Government attorney argue successfully that there was no “jurisdiction” because no “claim” had come into existence. 

Courts went along with this argument and required contractors to redo the entire administrative process. That sometimes caused contractors to lose two to three years of interest, or to settle on unfavorable terms to avoid the delay in receiving monies to which they were entitled.

See: Sun Eagle v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 465 (1991)(where no dispute existed, the claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).

This absurdity came to an end for the most part in 1995 in the cases of Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d. 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) and Raven Industries, Inc. v. Kelso, 62 F. 3d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  In Reflectone, the Federal Circuit divided requests for payment into two categories: routine and non-routine.

A “non-routine” request for payment is considered a “claim” for CDA purposes unless the contractor includes language within its claim document stating that the request should not be processed as a claim.

 A routine invoice submitted for payment is not a claim. (FAR § 33.201).  However, a contractor can easily convert this type of payment request into a claim by submitting a written notice to the CO stating that the invoice is considered “in dispute” or that the agency has unreasonably delayed in making payment. 

An unreasonable delay will automatically result in the conversion of a routine request into a claim. S-Tron, ASBCA No. 45890, 94-3 BCA ¶ 26,957 (6-month delay); DoD Contracts, Inc., ASBCA No. 47509, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,641 (5½-month delay); but see: Maudlin Dorfmeier Construction, Inc., GSBCA No. 11068, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,217 (41-day delay not unreasonable). 

But, there is no need to litigate whether the delay is unreasonable.  The best approach is to write a formal letter to the CO telling the CO that the request for payment is a “claim”. 

2. Termination for Convenience (“T for C”) Settlement Proposals

One type of claim—a termination for convenience claim-- is still subject to the “dispute” requirement.  Prior to the Reflectone decision, a termination for convenience (“T for C”) settlement proposal was not considered a “claim” until an “impasse” had been reached.  See Mayfair Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 841 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

The theory was that a T for C was a proposal that was to be negotiated in accordance with a specific contract clause.  

After Reflectone, T for C settlement proposals would appear to be considered non-routine submissions.  However, in James E. Ellett Construction Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the Federal Circuit effectively reintroduced the “impasse” test.   See Rex Systems, Inc. v. Cohen, 224 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Supposedly to remove “ambiguity” over when an “impasse” was reached, the Court now requires that negotiations be “abandoned by both parties”.  This new “test”, of course, solves nothing. 

How can a contractor prove that the Government has abandoned negotiations?  What if an agency acts to gain negotiating leverage by stating that the agency is still considering the contractor’s submissions, or that it needs additional information to evaluate the proposal, all of which delay resolution while no interest in the termination settlement proposal is being incurred? 

What if the contractor continues to attempt to negotiate?  Can the contractor abandon negotiations in this circumstance?  Further, if a settlement on a T for C proposal is ultimately reached after such extended delays, contractors must make sure that the settlement agreement includes the recovery of interest under the CDA from the date the claim was submitted. But the Government may debate this point.

In Rex Systems, the Court held that the signing of a settlement agreement in a T for C dispute proved that there had been no “impasse” and CDA interest was denied.

While the Federal Circuit held that a T for C proposal could ripen into a claim from undue delay, England v. Swanson Group, supra, this exception only reinforces the manufactured “dispute” scenarios that Reflectone and Raven were intended to eliminate.

V. Why are CDA claims significant? The Ability of Contractors to Control Timing

CDA claims provide contractors with the ability to control actions and processing times with respect to their submitted claims.  As mentioned above, a REA gives the contractor no rights -- it is simply a request to the Government to make payment, a type of billing statement.

A CDA certified claim gives the contractor very specific procedural rights that can be enforced by a Board or Court. Contracting Officers have 60-days to decide the CDA claim, which may result in a settlement during that time frame.

1. Interest Recovery  (When does it start).

Interest recovery on CDA claims commences on the date that the certified document or claim over $100,000 was submitted to the Contracting Officer. 

Most contractors believe that the fair approach is to accrue interest only for actual cost expenditures at the time the claim is submitted in situations in which a portion of the costs claimed has yet to be incurred, or will continue to be incurred in the future. 

In fact, there is a line of case law decisions stating that contractors may collect interest on the full amount of their claims even though some of the costs have yet to be incurred.  See discussion in Servidone, 931 F.2d 860 (Fed.Cir. 1991).

In the past, there have been disputes over the payment of interest on CDA claims.  Such disputes are largely a thing of the past; most contracting officers and Government trial attorneys understand the obligation to pay interest from the date the claim is submitted. 

With the current low-interest rates, sizeable amounts of interest are often not produced unless the claim has been in litigation for a number of years.  When interest rates were high, it was not unusual to see situations in which Boards or Courts awarded interest recoveries almost equal to the principal claim amount.

2. Time Limits (Using the sixty-day rule).

The federal Contracting Officer has 60 days to issue a final decision on a CDA claim.  If the claim is complex, the CO may request a "reasonable" additional amount of time.  The author has seen situations in which the Government actually asked for 18 months to decide a claim.  That is not a reasonable period of time.  If the contractor has spent six months to prepare and submit a claim, perhaps giving the Government 60 additional days to decide is "reasonable".

Some agencies have also now gotten to the point where they simply ignore issuing a final decision if the parties are truly in dispute over a particular matter. This may also be caused by staffing limitations -- insufficient legal and/or contracting personnel to prepare a final decision. 

It is perhaps better to have no final decision than a thoughtless one. Agencies may, therefore, be inclined to simply let the case go to the Courts or the Boards of Contract Appeals without a final decision.  They can then answer the contractor’s CDA claim when they file their response to the contractor’s complaint at either the Board of Contract Appeals or the Court of Federal Claims.

Example

A claim is submitted, 60 days goes by, and on the 61st day, the contractor appeals to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.  The Board will docket the appeal and tell the contractor it has 30 days in which to file its complaint.  If the Government does not object, the case will simply go forward without a final decision. 

This has become something of a trend.  There was a time when the Government objected to appeals and attempted to have them remanded to the Contracting Officer so that additional time would be consumed to issue a final decision.  If everyone knows the final decision is going to be negative, then what is the point?  Why not simply move on with the litigation?

VI. Example: The “conversion” of a routine contract administration action or a REA into a CDA claim. 

As stated above, the conversion of either pending routine contract administration actions or of REAs into CDA claims is relatively simple and straightforward. 

In most instances, if the underlying initial document submitted to the Government has been prepared correctly, a cover letter along the following lines will be satisfactory to convert such requests to CDA claims:

Contracting Officer

Government agency

Washington, DC

Re: Contract number ____________Contracts Disputes Act Claim and Certification

Dear Sir:

            On _______, XYZ Corp. submitted to you a (request for payment, REA, request for waiver, etc.). As of this date, you have not acted upon the ___________ in which the contractor requests payment from the Government under this contract. 

            The contractor has stated the contractual basis under which he believes he is entitled to increased costs in the amount of $ __________.  The contractor has also provided you with his estimated costs and backup for this requested amount in document ___________, attached to the original request submittal.

            Accordingly, the contractor has submitted the necessary materials for a claim under the Contract Disputes Act, and it hereby states that it asserts a claim based upon this letter and the documents previously provided, which are now attached as exhibits to this CDA claim document.

            The parties are in dispute over the contractor's entitlement to recover these sums.  Please issue the necessary Contracting Officer’s final decision within the next 60 days as provided for in the Contract Disputes Act.

            Also in accordance with the CDA, interest hereby commences running from the date of this letter on this claim.

(If a CDA claim is $100,000 or over, a certification by a Company Officer must be attached. See FAR section 52.233-1)

Very truly yours,

The contractor

VII. Alternatives to REA: Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) and other contract vehicles leading to changes to contract price and delivery schedule.

Many agencies have different vehicles under which price adjustments and delivery schedule adjustments are made to the contract. Contractors often use these to present bills for performing additional work. This approach is in place of using a REA.

1. Engineering Change Proposals.

Often the Contracting Officer will say "just submit an engineering change proposal" if you have a defect in the specification that you believe requires attention.

If the contracting officer is being reasonable and processing engineering change proposals, finally incorporating them into the contract when appropriate, then that is just another type of routine contract administration action which avoids either REAs or CDA claims. 

Bear in mind also that an engineering change proposal that is not acted upon can readily be made into a CDA claim (it would seem there would be no reason to make it into a REA: the engineering change proposal is something of an REA - it just has a different name).

Other Similar Vehicles

The list of potential adjustment vehicles for altering the contract is long.  Some agencies prefer for contractors to present their entitlement bases and costs by using requests for waivers, requests for deviations, or other similar forms or terms.  Other agencies, in which significant amounts of Government property are involved, use forms to remedy discrepancies in property situations. Sometimes these submittals are called “Condition Reports”.

The point here is that whatever form is working between the two parties to cause adjustments to be made to the contract in a fair and reasonably prompt fashion should be embraced.  There is no need to try to override them with the procedural approaches discussed earlier in this material. 

If something is working to resolve matters before they become disputes -- fine -- use such techniques so long as they are ethical and legal.  The approaches described in this section are certainly both.

2. Payment Vouchers Issues.

There are areas in which the Prompt Payment Act and the Contract Disputes Act appear to overlap, as well as areas in which the two statutes produce confusing results.  Those are outlined below:

  • Prompt Payment Act. The Prompt Payment Act is intended to cover delays in payment. For example, the Government loses an invoice, the Government has people on vacation, the invoice does not get processed, etc. Once 30 days have passed the contractor is entitled to interest. These late payments result from administrative difficulties.

  • Progress Payments. There are case law and regulatory materials indicating that the Prompt Payment Act does not cover progress payment requests. The theory is that these are mechanisms for making payments. There is not a sum certain amount that is due at that moment in time. Therefore, there cannot be a prompt payment that is due. Progress payments are discretionary in terms of the exact amount based upon a number of issues -- costs incurred -- stage of completion etc. (FAR 32.503-6)

  • Disputes over Payments—withholdings. The Contract Disputes Act steps in when disputes between the parties cause the Government to withhold payments. Contractors must be careful in such circumstances. If an invoice has not been paid, find out if there is some dispute about the underlying work. If so the Prompt Payment Act will not give you interest.

In such circumstances, the contractor must certify the failure to pay as a CDA claim based upon their view that the underlying dispute should be resolved in its favor.  This at times requires fairly aggressive action and pressing upon the Contracting Officer as to why a payment has not been made. 

  • Internal Company Policy on Payment Delays. Many contractors have a policy of certifying an invoice as a CDA claim when it has not been paid in a specific period of time - say 90 days. They are prepared to give up the 60 days of interest that they will lose if the Prompt Payment Act does not apply and there is an underlying dispute.

As an example, under a Corps of Engineers contract you are not being paid your progress payments, and/or the Corps is making periodic percentage reductions from your payments because they believe some portion of the work has not been correctly performed. If you believe that the work has been correctly done, you can file a separate claim relating to the deficient work issue and put that matter in dispute. 

Under such circumstances, it might also be wise to certify each progress payment invoice that is not paid in part because of the underlying dispute.  That would provide an additional backup position to claim interest on the failure to make the progress payments even though this would certainly not be covered by the Prompt Payment Act. We have seen this approach work.

  • No Spin—Candid talk with your Customer. Be candid and honest with the Contracting Officer, explaining why it is difficult to characterize your claim. Simply tell the Government what the impact is and submit each non-payment as a CDA claim. The claims will then be combined at some later time.

VIII. The Certification Process.

1. What Should the Certification State?

The certification requirements for claims are set forth in the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 605 (c) (1):

For claims of more than $100,000, the contractor shall certify that the claim is made in good faith, that the supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief, and that the amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the Government is liable.  See FAR § 33.207(c ).

It makes sense to simply copy this statutory language into your claim.

2. Who Should Sign the Certification?

As discussed above, prior to legislation in 1992, there was constant, esoteric litigation over which particular person within a company should sign claims for the company.

See: United States v. Grumman, 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir. 1991) cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991) (chief financial officer held not to have overall responsibility for the affairs of the company); Ingalls Shipbuilding v. O’Keefe, 986 F. 2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (a certification was held invalid because the person signing was not physically present at the contract site).  Congress finally resolved these problems.

In 1992, the Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvement Act changed the law to include more common sense standards.  Now, the person signing must merely be authorized to legally bind the corporation. FAR § 33.207(e).  That should cover most individuals who would be expected to sign claim certifications.

Further, if the person who signs the certification is later found to be unauthorized, the claim is no longer considered a nullity. FAR § 33.207(f).  If the company submitted the certification with the good faith belief that the person was authorized to do so, this “defect” can be corrected without having to go through the entire administrative process again. Metric Constructors, Inc., ASBCA No. 50843, 98-2 BCA ¶ 30,088. 

Interest will therefore still run from the date the claim is initially received by the Contracting Officer. FAR § 33.208(c).

3. What is a Certification “Defect”? 

Essentially, if submissions are made in a good faith attempt to certify the claim, any “defect” can be corrected. See: McDonnell Douglas Corp., ASBCA No. 46582, 96-2 BCA ¶ 28,377 (certification by an unauthorized employee may be corrected as "deficient."); Herman B. Taylor Const. Co. v. GSA, GSBCA No. 12915, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,406 (omission of the term "certify" or equivalent term); DMS Inc., ASBCA No. 45723, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,367 (failure to track precise FAR language).

However, there is no “claim” to be corrected when the contractor fails to include a certification at all. England v. Swanson Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004 (contractor failed to submit a claim or convenience termination proposal following Board decision to convert default termination); Sam Gray Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 526 (1995)(no true attempt to certify where no resemblance to statutory language other than "coincidental" use of words "good faith."); and Eurostyle, Inc., ASBCA No. 45934, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,458.

Is an SF 1436 “certification” submitted with a termination for convenience claim effective as a CDA certification?  The ASBCA initially took the position that an SF 1436 was not a CDA certification and could not be corrected. Chan Computer Corp., ASBCA No. 46763, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,005. 

However, the Federal Circuit implicitly overruled Chan in James M. Ellett Const. Co., Inc. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996), finding that the SF 1436 contained similar language to that of the CDA, and was a sufficient certification. 

4. What Does “Accurate and Complete” Data Mean?

The certification requirement that supporting data is “accurate and complete” for a CDA claim is not as rigorous as the Truth in Negotiations Act requirement to provide “current, accurate and complete” cost and pricing data.  But remember, at the end of the claim process, a contract modification will likely be issued:  a cost and pricing certificate will then be required.

As a practical matter, since the CDA claim is intended to induce a favorable CO decision, the key supporting data should, at a minimum, be attached to the claim or at least referenced.        

As a practical matter also, if there is information which arguably contradicts the claim or the amount requested, this information should also be disclosed and explained.  If a contractor cannot demonstrate why this apparently negative information does not affect the amount claimed, the claim should not be filed.

5. Are New Certifications Required for Supplements, Changes?

A “supplemental” claim under the same contract, which is based on different facts and circumstances, is a different claim and requires a new certification.  For example, a defective specification claim cannot be “supplemented” with a claim for a failure to furnish unrelated contract drawings under the same contract without a new certification (assuming this claim exceeds $100,000).  

This rule recognizes that the timetable for the recovery of interest on claims should only begin to run on those claims actually presented to the Contracting Officer.

If a revised amount for the same claim is generated based on new information that was not reasonably available at the time the original claim was submitted, a new certification is not required. J.F. Shea Co. v. UnitedStates, 4 Cl. Ct. 46 (1983). But, many contractors file one in any event.

However, if the information was reasonably available, the claim amount cannot be increased without a new certification. See Toombs and Co. Inc., ASBCA No. 35085 et al., 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,997; and Southwest Marine Inc., ASBCA No. 39472, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,126. 

If the claim was less than $100,000, and if the new data relating to the same claim causes the amount to exceed $100,000, a new certification is not required. Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 586 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

When the submission of a supplement to the claim makes it exceed $100,000, the contractor should identify the new information that led to the upward revision. 

Since the failure to submit a new certification could potentially cause a loss of interest, it is recommended that a new certification be submitted with any claim supplement.  The revision should state the facts that support the contractor’s position that the same claim is involved and that the information necessitating a supplement was only reasonably discoverable after the original claim submission. 

If the contractor believes a new certification is not legally required, there should be a specific statement that the new certification is considered precautionary and that the contractor reserves its right to recover interest from the date of the original certification.

IX. Time Consumption for Settlements

As indicated above, the 60-day clock, in theory, allows the contractor to force the contracting officer to make his or her decision within 60 days of when the claim was certified and submitted.  While that is a theoretical possibility, it is generally contrary to common sense.

In many cases, a contracting officer can fairly value a smaller claim within 60 days.  But, it is not reasonable to believe that the contracting officer and the contractor will be able to meet several times for fact-finding negotiations, and to then do necessary follow up, bottom-line types of negotiations within 60 days. 

Therefore, contractors must use common sense in moving forward. Is progress being made in initial negotiations?  Is the contracting officer acting reasonably and asking for needed additional information?  Is a DCAA audit required (it often is) -- and is it being scheduled in a reasonable period of time given other workload requirements and the time such audits have historically taken at the contractor's facility?

While the 60-day clock may have already run, a good settlement often takes a significant additional period of time in the negotiation process.  Therefore, contractors need to judge the progress that is being made and work with the contracting officer to arrive at a settlement.

A. The Relationship between Federal, State, and Local Government REA, Claims and the Claims of Primes and Sub-Contractors

1. STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS REAS AND CLAIMS.

This text is written primarily from a federal contract REA and claims perspective.  The U.S. Federal Government is the largest contracting party in the world; it buys over $600 billion of supplies, services, and construction annually. If the amount of healthcare supplies and services purchased for the country’s individuals is accounted for -- and contracting is involved in much of it -- the sums are even more staggering.

But, it would be a mistake to think that the REA and claims process is significantly unique in terms of how contractors present their claims to the Federal Government while performing projects with taxpayers’ money. 

This contract REA and claims process also go on at the State and Local procurement levels, and as discussed below, it similarly occurs in pure commercial settings as well.  The only significant differences are as follows:

  • Federal certification issues, and the rules surrounding such certifications;

  • But there are unique procedural rules in place at differing State or Local Agencies; and

  • There are Variances as to legal claims concepts among differing procurement groups.

As an overall matter, REA and claims preparation, submission, and defense concepts that apply at the Federal level are also largely applicable to State and Local procurements, as well as to commercial contracts.  It is often the procedures and rules at the local level that create REA and claims difficulties for unwary contractors unfamiliar with local procurement practices.

2. Notice of Claim Requirements; State/Local vs. Federal

For example, as discussed in more detail infra., Courts and Boards of Contract Appeals in Federal Government contract circumstances largely ignore contract clauses imposing timely identification and similar types of procedural requirements as to extra work claims (including the need for written orders from Contracting Officers prior to performing change order work). 

However, this is often not true in State and Local procurements, in which the failure to follow such detailed procedures may result in an absolute bar to an otherwise meritorious claim.  Before contracting with a State or Local Government, contractors must become familiar with claim preparation requirements that are applicable to each entity they are contracting with, including notification deadlines.

3. The “Forms” for REA/Claim Submission to State and Local Governments

Determining what constitutes extra work, and the claim theories applicable to such extra work, as well as the techniques for the pricing of these claims, are, in almost all cases, very similar at the Federal, State, and Local levels, as well as in the commercial contract arena. 

In short, the materials here are helpful in all contract claims situations no matter who the procuring party is. Similarly, these materials are also helpful for State or Local Government officials looking for successful means by which to defend against claims as such defenses are very similar at the Federal, State, and Local levels (as well as in commercial contract situations).

But the timing of claim submission, the claim’s content, and the proper identification of individuals permitted to make contracting decisions are the principal claims preparation and defense factors to be considered in all of the varying contract scenarios.

Additional examples of legal similarities at all levels of government or commercial use are presented below:

  • Eichleay Formula Issues. The Eichleay formula is a means utilized to prove daily costs incurred by contractors due to work delays caused by Government actions and/or inactions. The various Boards of Contract Appeals, as well as other Federal Courts, created and fleshed out this calculation approach.

Yet, there is also a large amount of New York state law discussing the details of how to prove compensation under the Eichleay formula for compensable delay claim situations in commercial contract settings.

  • Spearin Issues. As discussed in more detail infra., this concept comes out of a 1918 Supreme Court case -- Spearin v. United States, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S.Ct. 59 -- that involved a dispute between the Federal Government and a contractor who was installing sewerage equipment at a Government base.

The dispute arose due to a conflict between the performance specifications and the actual detailed plans and specifications, both of which were provided by the Government.  The Supreme Court confirmed the concept that contractors are entitled to rely upon detailed plans provided by the Government despite ultimate conflicts between such detailed plans and overall performance specifications, thereby making the Government liable for additional costs incurred when its detailed plans are later found to be flawed. 

This is a touchstone of the important "defective specification" doctrine at the Federal level.  Yet, you will also see the Spearin doctrine discussed in many defective specification cases originating at the State and local levels, as well as in commercial contract disputes.

B. The Relationship of Subcontractors vs. Prime Contractors with Claims; and Buyers vs. Sellers Commercially

As will be discussed at various points throughout these materials, subcontractors’ and vendors’ claims are intimately related to the Government claim being presented and processed. This is true at all Government agencies because subcontractors perform a major part of some work efforts.

If the Government formally or constructively changes the prime contractors work, it will in all likelihood affect a part of one or more subcontractor's work and change that as well.  The subcontractor will have a request for an adjustment due to such changes to its work.

Therefore, it is a common occurrence to see the prime contractor presenting a claim to the Government Agency that includes several subcontractor claims.  This is particularly true in construction contracts but also occurs in prime/subcontract supply and service contract relationships. How can prime and sub protect themselves in their situation? We explain this and include forms for use in our discussions below.

C. Agency Concerns

The Government Agency needs to know whether the REA or claims of the sub against the prime are valid and whether the agency, in turn, has responsibility for causing various actions during the course of contract performance.

In other words, two immediate questions arising for the Government Agency when it sees subcontractor REAs or claims in a prime claim are:

a. Is the sub’s claim valid against the prime? Does the prime have defenses?

b. Is the prime’s claim valid against the Government Agency for the subcontractor’s cost because the Government Agency caused those costs to be incurred by the prime?

If the answer to either of these questions is no, then the Government Agency may not be liable on the sub’s claim to the prime.

Government Agencies do not focus adequately on these issues. Often the claim of the sub against the prime is invalid because of legal defenses.

D. Subcontractor/Vendor Concerns dealing with REAs and Claims.

The subcontractor has issues to consider in terms of dealing with its prime contractor on claims issues.  Will the subcontractor agree to have the prime contractor sponsor its claim against the Government Agency?  What risks are inherent in doing that? What rights is it giving up?    (See Joint Appeal Agreement in the Appendix.)

In addition, are the subcontractor’s proof and legal requirements for its claim the same as those for the prime in presenting claims to the Federal Agency?  The answer to this question is:  they may be the same in a generalized way; but often things are drastically different, i.e.:

  • Notice requirements that must be given for subcontractors’ claims versus prime contractors’ claims.

  • The lack of a “constructive change” doctrine at the subcontract level.

  • The differences in proof and law under the Uniform Commercial Code and in many substantive areas (i.e. inspection, acceptance, and latent defects, to name only a few).

  • Thoughtful action and caution are in order.

E. Application of The CDA to Prime and Subs.

The CDA does not directly apply to disputes between subcontractors and their prime contractors, but (as will be explained below) the CDA is of vital importance in determining how subcontractors’ rights are determined under most Government contracts. 

If the prime is required to follow the CDA, subcontractors will surely be expected in many circumstances to conform to their prime contractors’ contractual requirements. These issues are discussed at various points throughout the text. 

The comprehensive treatment of the intricacies involved in prime/subcontractor award and performance issues is contained in a separate text: Subcontracting: Strategies for Primes and Subcontractors.

X. An Introduction to System and Contract Structuring for REA and Claims Causes.

The following discussion includes a breakdown of common drivers associated with contract structuring that affects the REA/claims process:

1. Fixed Priced Contracts. 

This type of contract almost guarantees the production of claims.  The contractor must be right about both its original bid as well as its performance plan.  Otherwise, cost overruns will occur on the contract. 

A cost overrun by itself means nothing.  But, a REA/claim may be appropriate if the contractor can prove that the overrun was caused because the Government altered the planned method and/or manner of performance, or that the Government caused work delays or some other type of compensable event.

There is high pressure on a contractor in a fixed priced setting because its estimating and performance must be correct in order to realize planned profits. Mistakes by contractors under such contracts are the contractor’s sole problem.  But, if the Government creates or compounds a problem, a compensable claim may well arise.

The following outline demonstrates how fixed priced contracts work in key areas affecting claims:

  • Maximum Contract Risk. Fixed-priced contracts maximize the contractor’s cost incurrence and profit loss risks – thereby resulting in the highest likelihood of claims and pressure to recover them.

  • The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA). The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) requires contractors to compete for virtually all fixed-priced contracts. As a contractor lowers his price because of competition, the pressure on the accuracy of its bid and performance plan rise -- therefore increasing the likelihood of claims.

  • Mis-estimate/Poor Performance. In these circumstances, the contractor must spend its own money to overcome contractual problems or to maintain schedules or both -- when the contractor has to spend its own money; economic necessity forces it to look harder at whether someone else is responsible for performance problems.

  • Safety Value. There are several ways that a fixed price contractor can receive a price increase if the facts support such a position:

    • The impossibility of performance. The contractor proves that it is economically insensible for any contractor in its position to spend the amount of money needed to attain performance objectives. Such a contractor may be excused from further performance even without formal Government action.

    • Cardinal Change Doctrine. This occurs when the Government makes changes that are so large and drastic to the contract that they are found to be a breach and beyond the original contract’s scope. This may be an excuse for the contractor from further performance, and may perhaps result in the recovery of additional funds if the correct factual circumstances are present.

    • Regular Changes (Directed and Constructive). With respect to changes claims, factual circumstances may actually occur thereby allowing the contractor to establish that the Government formally or informally (constructively) made changes to the contract work. That gives the contractor the right to submit a REA or claim for increased costs, which can relieve the pressure of the fixed-priced aspect of the contract.

2. Cost Type Contract.

In this type of contract, the contractor is paid all of its costs of performance plus some reasonable profit.  The contract ordinarily allows the contractor to stop work if the Government does not pay the actual costs that have been incurred in performance. 

Under such contracts, the contractor obviously needs to have a more sophisticated accounting system that tracks and displays all costs incurred on the contract.  But, if it can do so the contractor is entitled to either be paid these costs or to have the contract ended without further liability. 

As you can imagine, given this situation (with proper management) that exists under cost type contracts, there should be no claims of any kind.  The contractor simply spends the money the Government provides and stops when there are no more funds.  This process subsumes all claims for extra work.

The following is a checklist for this type of contract:

  • Least Cost Risk on Contractor - Little Claim Likelihood.

  • Mis-estimate/PoorPerformance - Government’s Initial Legal Obligations to Pay. No contractor responsibility.

  • Safety Value - Economic/Political/Funding Issues. A “bad” contract simply has no more funds available. It is over, but political fallout may be great.

3. Mixed Cost and Fixed Price Contracts, which May Cause Obligation Confusion:

a. Time and Material.

Focus on the fact that in the standard situation the pricing for each unit of work is "fixed", but the number of units that will be paid for is effectively "cost type".  You will always get the same unit price -- but there is significant flexibility in terms of the number of those units that are ordered.  If the Government wants more units it must generally pay for them.

b. Fixed Price – Incentive Fee – With a 130% Ceiling. 

Note that this "fixed priced" contract is in effect cost type until the ceiling of the 130% is reached.  All costs (subject to small disallowances in the Government's regulations) are reimbursed up to 130% of the original bid price.  A contractor would have to make a serious misestimate to not be reimbursed its costs up to 130% of its original estimate.  The contract becomes fixed priced once again when contractors exceed their estimate by 30% or more. There is most often a sharing formula in the contract for savings under 100% of contract at price and up to 130% ceiling.

c. Special Funding Clauses with “Caps,” “Not to Exceeds,” “Fixed” Budget, etc.

These clauses may be structured in a way that results in a flexibly priced or cost-type contract being changed into one that is firm fixed priced at a specified point.

All of the foregoing topics are covered in much greater detail below and in "Managing Cost Type Contracts.

XI. What Recurring Issues are Causing Claims In Contracts at All Levels: Government and Commercial?  What Can Be Done to Prevent Them?

1. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION ISSUES/CONCEPTS

A fundamental principle of contract law is that the party performing the contract work, (generally the contractor), is required only to comply with the minimum requirements of the contract.  He does not need to add extra features or special items.  He need only comply with the minimum requirements of the contract as stated in the contract specifications, drawings, schedules, other documents, etc.

This is a very broad statement, which has many nuances and exceptions, but it is the starting point in understanding why claims occur under Federal Government and other contracts.

A. MINIMUM V. MAXIMUM INTERPRETATION STRUGGLES

The parties to most contracts are in a constant state of debate over what the contract actually requires.

No matter how good a job the parties do in drafting the contract, it is not at all unusual in most contracts for there to be potentially different interpretations of the contract’s provisions.  The following questions are often debated during negotiations and performance, and warrant discussion now:

  • What does the contract require? Who decides this?

  • What did the parties intend the contract provisions to mean? Does it matter?

  • Is there a better interpretation than that being advanced by the other party? Does it matter?

  • The parties discussed an issue during contract negotiations and resolved it, even though it is not reflected in the written document. What is the requirement’s status? (Do you understand the parol evidence rule and its practical consequences?)

These and many other questions start the debate over what the minimum requirements are in a contract.  Obviously, from an economic point of view (but perhaps not a political point of view), the contractor wants to do the least amount of work that will be acceptable, and the Government Agency (or the other party) wants the most possible work done. 

The Tension in Interpretations

The party who has placed the contract (the government, prime, etc.) is in a position of some substantial leverage:

  • If the contractor states a minimum interpretation position, and the buyer or the Government Agency does not agree with it, it has the option of eventually default terminating and/or refusing to accept the item or pay for it.

  • Obviously, if the default is found to be wrong, that is a breach of contract, and the issuing party would be subject to damages. The party canceling the contract must be right. But, you can see the developing leverage that the Agency or prime or buyer has. The mere fact that it has the right to take this action -- even though it could later be proven wrong -- is very substantial negotiating leverage indeed.

The Seller’s Resistance

From the contractor’s or seller’s perspective, its position requires a strong stomach, and the will to insist and resist:

  • It must reasonably establish its minimum contract interpretation position.

  • It must have a basis for its position, either in the contract bid or proposal, or in trade practices, or elsewhere.

  • It must articulate its position in a straightforward fashion so that the other side can understand the position. (Remember the other party can and may well issue a default termination if they do not understand!)

  • In the final analysis, it may have to run the risk of a rejection and a default termination if the dollar amount of the differences in the party’s interpretation is significant. No one should bankrupt their company over an interpretation dispute – yet people do.

The REA/Claim Connection

But, you must understand that the foregoing issues are on the basis of REA and claims formation and defense issues. 

It is this tension or constant "pushing and shoving" over contract specification interpretation that goes on throughout contract performance on many contracts that results in either good contract administration, if the parties solve their differences through routine contract administration actions, or that results in a tremendous mass of litigation if the parties polarize their positions and allow everything to become a claim.

The following case law provides examples of disputes over minimum interpretation:  

  • Trataros Construction, Inc. v. GSA, GSBCA No. 15083, 01-1 BCA ¶ 31,308 (Where sprinklers were to be installed in the “areas indicated” and “special application areas”, but the drawings did not clearly indicate that sprinklers were to be installed in attics or towers, Government direction to install the sprinklers there was a constructive change.)

  • A.R. Mack Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 50035, 01-2 BCA ¶ 31,593 (Where there was no specification calling for pipe depth, a direction to install the pipe 5 ½ feet deep was a constructive change. Here, the omission was not an “obvious” one requiring inquiry because drawings were to be supplied by the contractor, an indication that the contractor would specify the depth.)

b. Some Examples Showing the Range of Contract Interpretation Regarding Minimum Requirements.

Professor Nash states as follows with respect to these interpretation issues:

Since it is a general rule of Government contracting that a contractor is entitled to follow the least expensive means of achieving contract performance, the insistence by the Government that the contractor follows a higher standard (and probably more expensive means) of performance is tantamount to a change order. [R. Nash, Jr. Government Contract Changes, Second Edition 1989, Section 14-2 through 14-4 and 16-43 at p. 11-31].

*                      *                      *

Normally, a contractor has the right to perform the work in the least expensive manner it can devise, regardless of how it computed its bid or any events that may have occurred prior to the award of the contract. [at p. 16-3]

[The author here agrees with the first quote above; he does not agree that the second quote is a result that would necessarily be produced in litigation at the Boards of Contract Appeals or the Court of Federal Claims]

Examples; Common Situations.

A corollary of the foregoing rules is that if a bidding document from a Government Agency specifies two alternative items, which can be used to perform a contract, the Government cannot require the contractor to use the most expensive means.  N.G. Adair, ASBCA No. 25, 961, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16, 887.

A further corollary of this occurs if the specifications present five alternatives which the contractor can use to perform: if the Government abridges the contractor’s options and says he may use only two and these are more expensive, the same rule prevails.  The Government pays the extra cost incurred over the least expensive means available.

The GEODSS Case Issues.

Note that the foregoing situations can occur on a contract that has detailed design specifications or performance specifications.  Indeed it is quite common to have broad performance specifications on which the Government states its preferred interpretation after award and thereby causes a constructive change to occur.  Performance specifications are not a defense to claims when the party pressures or requires an abridgment of available approaches.

The significance of bidding documents and the failure of the contractor to follow the commitments made in various types of proposal documents are discussed in TRW, Inc. (GEODSS), ASBCA Nos. 27,602, 27,299, 87-3 BCA ¶ 19,964.  The Government may well have deductive change claims for the contractor's failure to do things it specifically stated it would do in its bidding documents.

c. Some Root Cause Case Law Examples of Claims/REA Root Causes.

As an introduction, we should discuss the facts of the Apocalypse, Inc.case,  GSBCA No. 5963, 81-2, BCA ¶ 15, 265 and 15, 856.

The contractor was in a highly competitive area -- Guard services contracts.  There were very few ways for him to cut costs and thereby gain a competitive edge over other bidders.  The contract required the contractor to have each on-duty guard have a uniform; it did not say anything about the "sharing” of uniforms.

Consider the Board’s decision in this guard service contract case:

The contract does not expressly state whether the contractor has to furnish each of its employees with his or her own Sam Browne belt and tuffy jacket.  In fact, the contract is silent with regard to the quantity of Sam Browne belts and tuffy jackets that appellant had to furnish.  Appellant says that the only contract language stating a requirement for a quantity of Sam Browne belts and tuffy jackets is the requirement that each on-duty guard has a complete uniform.  Appellant contends that by furnishing on-duty guards with uniforms having properly fitting Sam Browne belts and Tuffy jackets it satisfied the contract’s requirement.  We agree.  Appellant reasonably interpreted the contract’s ambiguous uniform requirement.  Accordingly, we find that appellant should not have been required to buy additional Sam Browne belts and tuffy jackets.  Appellant is entitled to an equitable adjustment in the contract price for having complied with the Government’s order to buy enough jackets and belts so that each of the appellant’s employees would have his or her own.  [Id. at 75,589] [Emphasis added].

Another more complex case warrants analysis in illustrating a touchstone for the root causes of why claims occur.

In Bethlehem Steel Corporation, ASBCA No. 3341, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9186, the company bid against a number of other contractors for a follow-on ship construction contract.  The previous contractor had prepared detailed plans and drawings for use in the construction of the ship.  The contractor was able to buy these plans and drawings directly from the prior contractor per the solicitation document.

Problems developed in one particular area of the plans after the second contractor – Bethlehem Steel – had constructed the second group of ships in question.  There was excessive vibration in the deckhouse area.

The contract contained a generalized disclaimer stating that the construction contractor was responsible for assuring that the scantlings/(structural members) depicted in the structural plans were “adequate for their intended purpose”.

The Board pushed this disclaimer aside, and, after a debate over the issue of whether the specifications were of a performance or a design nature, held:

It is not useful and may not be possible to decide if the specifications as a whole are of a design or a performance type.  In as much as the Government chose to incorporate such details as it did, we agree with the appellant, other contract terms aside, the appellant had a right to rely on those details in estimating the cost of constructing the superstructures.  (Id. @ 42, 587.)

This is a significant distinction that the Board is making.  Debate goes on in many negotiations over whether a set of specifications are design (drawings, other details) or performance -- stating a broad set of requirements without details as to how to accomplish them.  The debate is often without end or conclusion because specifications are many times mixed, containing elements of both. 

What the Board is saying is that when one party gives details to the other side, the other side can then expect to rely upon those details.  From an economic view, this results in a lower price because the assumption is that the details will work.  There is, therefore, no need for engineering to design from scratch or redesign at least that part of the work.

What is the difference between performance specifications and design specifications?  What is their significance?

2. As indicated above, there is a very real difference between the two types of specifications. 

a. Design Specifications/Requirements.

Design specifications generally have engineering work built into them.  Costs have been expended and decisions made about exactly what the limitations, size, composition, and acceptance criteria of the item should be, and this information has been written down in a detailed set of specifications/drawings for the contractor to follow without fail.             

These types of specifications or requirements most often exist in fixed priced contracts.  Examples of the cause of claims under such specifications include the following: 

  • The Government has “given” the contractor the design of item prepared by another party.

  • The Government, therefore, pays for design once – not again on this contract and each following one.

  • The Government is responsible for design – it must be accurate, complete, and produce a satisfactory result when ordinary manufacturing techniques used.

  • The Government can give a contractor a design, and then attempt to disclaim responsibility for all or part of it. Does this make legal/economic sense? The answer is no.

Per the Spearin case, when the Government sets this type of design down the contractor has a right to rely upon it.  Indeed, it is the only way the contractor can be competitive in the bidding process because other contractors will rely upon it and bid low based on the assumption that the design is settled, and that there is no further engineering work to be done (or costs). 

The Government gets an advantage in the sense that it does not pay engineering costs a second, third, or fourth time, thereby forcing contractors to include such costs in their bids.

Real performance specifications also have distinctions and advantages.  They are discussed below.

b. Performance Specifications/Requirements.

These types of specifications or requirements occur in both cost type and fixed priced contracts.  On fixed priced contracts, they can also generate a large number of REAs and claims.

The Myth.

A popular belief by Government officials and prime contractors is that performance specifications eliminate REAs/claims on fixed priced contracts. This is completely incorrect. Actually, performance specifications can generate a great number of claims.

Checklist.

The following is a checklist for determining the presence of performance specifications:

  • The Government has not given the contractor a design; the contractor must create, select, and/or choose his own design/materials.

  • The contractor’s design must satisfy the performance requirements spelled out by the Government.

  • But, the Government may not limit or abridge the contractor’s choices regarding design, material, etc., after award. If it does so, that is a constructive change/claim. Can you imagine the number of disputes that can exist on this point?

Example.

The contractor proposes a low-cost design and says it will meet the Government's performance specifications.  The Government does not believe that.  But, the contractor has not produced the item yet. 

How can the Government prove that the contractor cannot satisfy the specifications?  If the Government makes a direction to beef up the design etc. and is proven wrong after the fact, it is responsible for the cost consequences for abridging the contractor's design alternatives.

Consider performance specifications in their broadest possible form, whether a ship is being constructed or a missile built.

For example, broad performance specifications could be used in a contract for a military cargo ship.  The ship will have cranes of a certain capacity.  The ship will be so long, so wide, and will use so much fuel per hour.  It will haul at least a specified amount of cargo. 

Does This Work?

Such specifications result in the contractor having sole responsibility for all design effort to accomplish the results and parameters set out above.  This is a broad performance specification situation.  There are no design details.  The Government has simply specified the results that it wishes to accomplish with this ship in terms of cargo transport, size, fuel consumption, etc. 

In these circumstances, the Government, in theory, waits until the contractor presents the ship for delivery, if the ship will not do what the specifications require, the Government may default terminate the contractor and start the process again, paying the contractor nothing, or recovering its progress payments made to the contractor during performance.

Can the Government Leave the Contractor Alone?

This method of proceeding is based upon the premise that contractors should be left alone during performance until delivery at which time the product is subject to the Buyer’s inspection and rejection or acceptance. Specifications such as the ones set out above are common for the purchase of commercial items, such as the transport ship example above.

Unfortunately, the use of such broad, performance specifications do not work well in the Government contracting area -- the Government does not want to be surprised by an item that does not work after a year of contract performance.  National security or some other Government goal may be compromised. 

Thus, the Government generally has inspectors that check to ensure the contractor is complying with the contract’s specifications and is progressing in accordance with the contract’s schedule.  But how and what are these inspectors checking, and when? What standards do they use, etc.? 

Government inspectors in such circumstances really have nothing but their speculation as to whether the contractor is going to be able to meet the broad performance goals.  Of course, if they see a ship being built that is only 500 ft. long when the Government had specified a length of 800 ft., that is an easy call and the inspector can demand correction of this deficiency. 

But what of a situation in which an inspector believes that the hull is being shaped and designed in a fashion that will result in the contractor’s failure to meet fuel efficiency requirements?  If the contractor responds that it is comfortable that its design is correct, a difficult situation could then arise.  What happens if the Government wishes to direct the contractor to fix what it perceives to be the problem?  That is discussed next.

c. Performance specifications may cause automatic REA/claims resolution.  Connection to cost-type contracts.

In situations in which a fixed priced contract with pure performance specifications are being utilized, if the Government allows the contractor to proceed, and either pass or fail on its own individual performance effort, the contractor’s potential claims are effectively barred. The only exception would be perhaps an impossibility of performance claim. 

If the Government does not intervene in the contractor’s design process while the contractor is attempting to meet broad performance specifications, it is the contractor's responsibility to do what is necessary to correct its design to meet those broad performance specifications. 

No claim against the Government is possible in this situation -- the Government took no action, made no corrections, and directed no alterations in the design.  The contractor proceeded with its design and simply failed.  The contractor must, therefore, correct its deficiencies with its own funds.

Again, if it produced a disastrous financial consequence for the contractor to follow up, and complete the work under such circumstances, he might be excused from performance on an impossibility of performance basis.

d. Requirements = Specifications.

Do the terms requirement and specification mean the same thing?  Yes, as a practical matter. Is everything in the contract a requirement or specification?  Yes.  All are subject to being at least constructively changed and thereby becoming a REA or claim.

3. Additional Related Topics Regarding Such Disputes.

a. Disclaimer issue.

Returning to the discussion of the Board’s decision in Bethlehem Steel Corporation, ASBCA No. 3341, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9186, there are related disclaimer issues that are often associated with these disputes. The Board made the following holding with respect to that disclaimer:

We have no doubt that valid and enforceable contract provisions could be written to require the contractor to base its bid price on the advertised specification, but require that, if the specifications prove to be inadequate and have to be “beefed up” so as to cause a large increase in the cost of building a ship, the contractor (will incur those costs without payment).

What about these disclaimer arguments?  What kind of a valid disclaimer is possible?

In the Bethlehem case, the Board of Contract Appeals did not enforce a disclaimer because it found it was too general.  The message here for both Government contractors and Government agencies is that broad open-ended disclaimers will not work.  Why?  One reason is they are fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with the basic contract bargain. 

If the Government gives the contractor a detailed design and knows the contractor will bid lower because the engineering work has already been done, how can it then disclaim responsibility for what it has given the contractor while keeping the lower price?  Fundamental fairness should nullify the effectiveness of broad, open-ended disclaimers in these circumstances.

See the decision in White v. Edsall Const. Co., Inc., 296 F.3d 1081, 2002 WL 1424175 (Fed. Cir. 2002), in which the Federal Circuit held that the Government’s inclusion of a clause requiring contractors to inspect the contract’s specifications did not negate the Government’s warranty as to the design it provided where the specifications were mixed performance and design, and the design aspects were based on Government engineering calculations. 

Detailed disclaimer versus general disclaimer. Does that mean all disclaimers will not work?  Of course not.  And, the Board says so in the foregoing holding in Bethlehem Steel.  Disclaimers that are specific, place the contractor on notice as to what it must do, and allow the contractor to make internal adjustments in its bid before award (i.e. include contingencies or management reserves to deal with various issues), are fair and will likely be enforced.

Recall that the Bethlehem Steel situation involved the failure of the deckhouse to perform correctly to vibration standards.  Let us assume that drawing number 125, which is a detailed design of the deckhouse, contains the following warning on it:

NOTICE – DRAWING #125

Contractors are placed on alert that problems have existed with this drawing in previous ship construction efforts by the Government.  Specifically, the detailed design shown on this drawing has not produced results that allow vibration standards to be met.  If this situation occurs on this contract, the Government will not pay the contractor any additional costs to correct the detailed design so as to meet the overall vibration standard.  Accordingly, contractors are advised to include necessary engineering funds in their bid to correct any errors discovered in this drawing.

What do you think?  Will the Board enforce this type of disclaimer?  We believe it would.  The disclaimer is very specific and advises contractors as to the actions they must take to protect themselves.  The disclaimer is basically fair.  It will likely be enforced.

Government agency personnel have stated to the authors that the use of such types of detailed disclaimers would result in increased bids. Yes, and that is exactly the point of a fair and specific disclaimer. 

b. Contingency Solutions.

The author has seen situations in which Government audit agencies, such as DCAA, have struck, as unallowable costs, all such contingencies for possible engineering costs to satisfy disclaimers from contract bids during pre-performance audits.  These types of actions during audit functions will result in unenforceable disclaimers.

If a contractor is providing cost or pricing data, there is nothing improper about including contingencies, factors increasing labor and materials, or other similar items so long as they are disclosed before or during negotiations.  See FAR §15.404-1(c)(2)(i)(A). 

Although the government has a tendency to reject contingencies because it wants absolute certainty in cost information, such certainty does not exist. 

For example, it is appropriate to disclose that “we have added 10% to all labor estimates because this is a new item, only partially based on historic costs, and we are not sure we can make the historic figures.”

Like other cost or pricing data, the disclosure of contingencies must be documented to be effective.  SeeAerojet-General Corp., ASBCA No. 12,873, 69‑1 BCA ¶ 7585.

c. The issue of an order of precedence clauses and related concepts in contracts—generalized goals.

It is not uncommon for the Government to include an order of precedence clause in the contract requiring that some form of generalized specifications take precedence over much more detailed specifications and/or drawings.

It is also not uncommon for there to be general goals and mission statements in a specification, which appear to take precedence over and/or even conflict with detailed requirements.

For example, consider the following:

  • A statement that a maximum amount of flexibility for modification in a computer system must be contained in the hardware of the computer system and that “software fixes should be minimized.”

  • A requirement that “a maximum amount of self-testing equipment should be included in the equipment.”

  • A requirement that the parties should use “good human factors engineering in all respects on equipment utilized as part of the overall items delivered.”

  • A statement that safety requirements in “connection with this equipment shall always be of paramount importance”.

All of the foregoing are statements of general goals and desires, and Courts have by and large rejected them as a basis for the Government’s or Buyer’s rejection of contract end-products. They are too generalized, not-specific-enough, and in some ways, they conflict with the more detailed requirements in the specifications, e.g. Kenneth Reed Construction Corp. v. the United States, 475 F.2d 583 (Ct.Cl. 1973); Carol Anne Kleeman v. the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir.1989).

Thus, including such items in contract specifications, and giving them first preference in a contract “order of precedence” clause (i.e. the contractor must meet the broad goals in any event) will generally not work.  As in Bethlehem Steel, the Board will enforce the detailed requirements, but find broad generalized requirements unenforceable, or simply in conflict under the Spearin doctrine regarding a detailed design and a performance specification.

XII. Checklist for Analysis of Additional Issues Affecting the Occurrence of REA Claims Generally and in Specific Contract Transactions.

Set out below is a list of additional issues that flow from the foregoing analysis: 

  • The contents of the technical proposal and whether it is incorporated or unincorporated in the contract. See TRW, Inc. (GEODSS), ASBCA Nos. 27602, 27299, 87-3 BCA ¶ 19, 964.

  • The issue of documents incorporated by reference, e.g. military specifications at difference levels, military handbooks, etc.

  • The issue of who is preparing the bid or proposal. (The issue for the Government is who prepared the specification and whether it was reduced to meet budgetary limitations.)

  • The issue of past experience with the same or similar specifications causing claims: both the contractor and the agency.

  • The issue of whether bidding documents are relevant on fixed priced contracts when claims occur. Should an effort be made to include details in bidding documents? What is the impact, good and bad?

  • Knowing an Agency’s reputation for claims in claims management, do you understand it?

  • Is this a one-time contract, or is a contract with a principal agency involved?

XIII. THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT’S IMPACT ON CLAIMS GENERATION

The rules above are impacted by the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984, 41 U.S.C § 253, et. seq.  Many individuals think that the Act establishes rules at the Federal level with respect to a preference for particular competitive procurement approaches.  That is true. 

But, the Act has also had an amplifying effect on the generation of claims over the last 30 years.  Consider the following: 

  • Prior to the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), the Federal Government spent almost ninety percent of its procurement dollars on a sole or limited source basis. That figure is now below forty percent. This is a remarkable increase in competition for federal procurement dollars.

  • What happened to all of these sole and limited source procurements?

  • What happens when there is now more competition and the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) certainly created more competition?

  • Contracts for think tanks, support services, and other highly complex items are now negotiated competitively when in the past they were placed with long-term contractors who had performed those services for years. Claims were rare.

  • How can a contractor be competitive in such highly technical situations?

  • The only honest and ethical way that a contractor can be more competitive is to reduce his costs directly and/or interpret the specifications in a way that causes him to lower the minimum standard to which he is bidding and performing.

  • What is the consequence of taking minimalist interpretation requirements during contract performance? Is it not more claims? Yes.

  • Will the Government Agency not reject and/or threaten default more often if the contractor goes lower and lower in his interpretations in order to be the most highly competitive to win the solicitation? Yes.

*                      *                      *

You have now been exposed in an introductory sense to the interrelated issues that are the root causes of REAs and claims and some solutions.  Keep these in mind as we examine more complex factual and legal situations that follow.  Understanding the root causes of REAs and claims will give you an advantage in solving/preventing the problems they create for the Government and for contractors.  This is a two-way street:  both parties to the contract will benefit from this knowledge.

XIV. Notice of Claims v. Timing of Claims Submission.

1. Introduction.

The notice of and timing of claims submissions are not the same things.

a. Notice of Claims.

The notice of claims involves legal requirements. When must the claim be asserted or filed to protect the parties’ rights under the contract?  This issue is fairly easily dealt with by understanding the rules and exceptions that apply to them.

b. The timing of Claims.

The timing of a claims submission involves practical and strategic issues.  When is it most desirable to submit a claim to ensure maximum recovery?  This is a complex and subjective area that is worthy of special attention. 

The best-prepared claim will not fare well if submission timing is poor.  Contractors are often far too late in submitting claims to maximize recovery. See, ECC International Corp. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 359 (Ct.Fed.Cl.1999)(interpreting Economic Price Adjustments Clause claim submissions)

2. Standard Notice of Claims Issues.

  • What does the contract say? [Examples: Changes, Government Property, and Differing Site Conditions have time limits.] Generally, assert in 30 days. Differing Site Claus is treated differently.

  • Why are these provisions in the contract? [Fairness to Government and primes]

  • Case law erosion of Government rights – a continual problem.

  • UCC Comparison – 2-209. The law that applies to most subcontract transactions – firm notice requirements.

  • Service Steel Erectors Co. v. SCE, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 177 (W.D.Va.1983); and

  • United States v. Centex Construction, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 411 (W.D. Va.1985).

  • Federal Statute of Limitations – generally six years. (Discussion infra.)

  • Practice Strategies [An old-fashioned agency contracting officer may enforce the contract’s written terms; I will not consider a claim not submitted within 30 days. Similarity to commercial situations.]

3. Timing:  End of Performance Submission vs. Incremental Submission of REAs/Claims.

This topic often arises in discussions as to the best strategy for timing the submission of extra work claims.  Should they be submitted in small increments as the work goes forward (is that inefficient?) or should they be accumulated and submitted towards the end of contract performance?

Often times the Marketing Department’s views of what is best for the company will come into play, and it will request/insist that the claim should not be submitted on existing contracts because:  “we are bidding on new work,” “the Government will be irritated by the submission of claims,” or “they think badly of us and it will affect the new awards.”

Also, it is often stated by contractor personnel that it is impossible to price individual claims on a stand-alone basis.  The total impact of the claim can only be shown as a group of claims that are aggregated.

While the foregoing are common statements and concerns by management elements, they are in almost every case contractually and legally incorrect.  Moreover, from a management strategy point of view, they reflect incorrect analysis and conclusions. Why do we say this?

  • First, going back to basics, the changes clause and most other remedy granting clauses in the standard Government contract, i.e. Government-furnished property, suspension, stop work clause, all require that any claim for increased compensation be at least asserted within 30 days of the occurrence of the events at issue.

  • The case law is not strong in the Government’s favor in terms of enforcing these particular provisions. By that we mean that if the case were litigated in a Board or a Court, and the Government’s sole defense was the lack of a 30-day notice, the Government will most often lose.

  • But, this situation does not detract from the fact that there is a contractual obligation to assert the claim within thirty days and that a contractor who does not do so should appropriately be criticized by Government officials for that failure.

  • We believe that more practical issues forcefully support the contractual requirements for prompt submission – the need to maximize cost recovery and the promptness of recovery.

4. The Contractor’s Ability to Deal with REAs and Claims Favorably.

REAs and Claims that are submitted on a stand-alone pricing basis, within 30 to 60 days of their occurrence, tend to be:

  • Better prepared.

  • Broken into manageable units that the contracting officer and his staff can deal with.

  • Better developed factually because they are written when events are fresh in people’s minds, and

  • Better priced/estimated.

It is simply human nature that if you do one small management task at a time, it can be better and more completely done in comparison to letting a whole series of tasks (i.e., claim preparation activities) accumulate to be dealt with at some later point in contract performance.

The author has never seen a contractor who regretted preparing individual claims as they occurred and submitting them incrementally to the agency (or prime).

Moreover, many of those contractors’ claims were settled individually or in packages as the work went forward, thereby avoiding impacts upon cash flow that could affect other contractors who wait too long before submitting their claims.

5. Deprivation of the Government’s Options of Resolving Claims by Waiting too Late in Contract Performance.

If the contractor (or sub) waits until the alleged change or extra work is completely performed, and the money spent, it deprives the Government (or prime) of fundamental options for administering contract performance:

  • The agency had two options for every change it consciously or unconsciously (constructively) ordered.

  • It could say no, do not spend the money – the change is then canceled.

  • It could say spend some (or all) of the money – or it is your responsibility to the base contract work.

  • After the money is spent, the Government now has only one option: pay all the money the contractor seeks, or fight such recovery.

  • Do you really think an agency wants to pay completely for every change it orders?

  • Do you really think an agency won’t withdraw change orders or directives? (They do all the time.)

  • And do not rush like an automaton to do everything you are told to do by an agency or prime, which may not have been thought through! Raise the issue promptly and professionally.

6. Fraud Waste and Abuse Issues.  (Introduction.)

The DOD Inspector General’s Indicators of Fraud Manual, states that the repetitive submission of omnibus claims, late in contract performance, is an indicator of fraud.

While the author disagrees with this conclusion, the fact remains that elements of DOD and other Government agencies think that this is true.  Moreover, for the reasons discussed in more detail herein, there is certainly more room for mistakes and errors at the end of performance, which could in various people’s minds rise to the level of misstatements.

XV. Conclusion

As can be seen from the foregoing, there are a number of legal and contractual rules which must be complied with in the REA and CDA claims area.  Those rules are fairly easy to understand and deal with.  What is more difficult are the strategy issues:  about how the claims process relates to ongoing performance on the contract.  There is no sense having good contract performance, and bad relationships with your agency customer because of how you handled the claim situation.  It is possible to do both -- good performance, good relationship and recovering fairly for extra work as you go forward. 

COST, PRICE AND ESTIMATE: PERHAPS THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT TERMS YOU NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHEN PERFORMING OR QUOTING ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

Additional Resources in this Section:

Contractor and government personnel are repeatedly misusing the terms “cost,” “price” and “estimate.”   Many times it does not make any difference, but there are times when misuse of these terms causes a critical communication problem.  This monograph explains the correct usage of these terms and the gray areas that one needs to be concerned about.

1. Confusion of Terms

It is easy to confuse and misuse the foregoing three terms.  Professionals even do it: individuals talk about the cost of this or the cost of that when, in fact, it is really not the cost, but an estimate, or perhaps a pricing decision, that the company has made.  That is permissible in informal discussions.  Certainly in writing, however, when representations are being made to government customers, it should be made clear exactly what is being talked about.

Stating to government representatives that something is a “cost” when it contains elements of a price or elements of an estimate, and not disclosing that fact is (at the least) a mistake.  It could be worse – a misrepresentation.

Be cautious in using these terms.  Make sure your compliance documents relating to the finance and contracts departments are sensitive to this issue, and monitor the materials going outside the company to be sure these critical terms are being appropriately distinguished in people’s minds and in their written presentations.

2. Cost (or Actual Cost)

Cost (or elements thereof) is generally assumed to be the actual cost as provable from a company’s books or records.  There may be allocations of costs from overhead pools to direct costs incurred, but generally there is an element of actual contemporaneous recording of costs by individual timekeepers, in cost records, or in purchase prices for materials on the company’s books.  Thus, “costs” may be provable or displayable in many ways, but the contemporaneous keeping and creating of records is expected.  DCAA will likely expect real contemporaneous records to exist for costs asserted to be actual.

However, when “costs” are recorded on breakdowns given to the government, those may well be actual “projected” or “forward looking costs.” Therefore, they are really much more like “estimates” of costs to be incurred, as discussed next.  They should probably be so identified as “estimated costs.” “projected costs,” or “forward looking costs.”

There is nothing wrong with estimated costs – just don’t call something “actual” when it is really an estimate.

3. Estimate (of Costs)

An estimate is often an element of either price or cost.  It should be labeled clearly as an estimate, and explained in terms of its basis and makeup.  An estimate may be a build-up that a company has done based upon various figures, expectations, contingencies, etc.  It generally does not represent actual costs incurred, and that should be made clear in writing.  It may well represent a projection of expected future costs to be incurred. 

To the extent that an estimate contains or includes in its backup some historical cost elements, such elements should probably also be explained.  The DCAA Audit Manual gives high priority to the reliability of historical costs when determining payments to be made under federal government contracts.  Do not miss the opportunity to use historical costs when available. 

An estimate could also be entirely pricing – simply what the company wants to get to produce a particular item and then there is an estimating of elements in terms of how to get to that price.  There is no direct relationship to cost.

 An estimate could also attempt to reproduce what actual costs have historically been or will be in the future. Carefully express this to your customers, if this is what you intend the estimate to provide.

[Generally, all data underlying an estimate must be disclosed to the government in order to be in compliance with the Truth in Negotiations Act (“TINA”).]

4. Price

In contrast to actual cost and estimated cost, the “price” is whatever the company chooses to set for an item in a market.  It can have no relationship whatsoever to “costs” or “estimates.” A company may choose to back-up its price with a “breakdown.”  That breakdown should clearly state whether it is also simply elements of the price that the company wishes to obtain for various subparts of the item.   It is most often not actual costs incurred, or to be incurred, and should so state. 

Stating that the price is backed up by a cost breakdown, which is not accurate or has no historical basis, can produce serious problems and misperceptions by government evaluators, and auditors. [It is also an obvious potential TINA violation or worse.]

5. The Foregoing Distinctions and Their Relationship to the Truth in Negotiations Act (“TINA”)

Items 1-4 above cover the basics of cost, price and estimates.  This is often the end of the analysis.  There are many contracts and separate pricing actions such as modifications that are not TINA covered. 

Nevertheless, understanding the foregoing distinctions and following them is important.  These distinctions become additionally more important when TINA covers the transaction – as of this writing, most negotiated non-competitive pricing actions over $750,000.  Then an error or mistake in using the terms can result in an obligation to make a refund to the government.

6. Can There Be False Estimates? Yes!

There has been some recent discussion of the situation that as all “estimates” are really only “judgments,” there cannot be liability of contractors for “estimates” because they cannot be inherently “false.”

This position is wrong and can create compliance problems. If elements of the estimate are false, or contain undisclosed factors or contingencies, that can be defective pricing or worse. And as most cost and pricing data is filled with many estimates, this is an area in which clarity is important.

7. The Estimating Process and TINA

Focus on the fact that it is the estimating process that contractors utilize to establish their prices. In one respect, TINA has nothing to do with that. The contractor should make his very best estimates and stick with it.  If the government then also estimates too high, that, in essence, has nothing to do with TINA. It is just a debate during negotiations. No TINA violations come out of the competently prepared estimate that the contractor believes in.

The TINA problems begin to occur when the contractor bases his estimates, in part, upon facts—historical labor, material, or overhead figures that exist in his book and records. The TINA issues also occur when the contractor has three quotes for an expensive component and makes the choice judgment of a higher-priced person because of perceived better quality. TINA problems persist when the contractor has historical overhead, and make forward looking projections as to whether there will be increases or decreases, and the reason why. All of these TINA implicated issues go far beyond the historical or actual figures that the contractor utilizes. Why? Because there are likely other pieces of data affecting all of these issues that are arguably

8. Disregarding Estimates and Data after Disclosure to the Government 

It is perfectly permissible for a company to say that it has provided all the necessary cost or pricing data, but that it does not intend to negotiate upon that data.  Its reasoning may be that the data used is viewed as unreliable --- that risks and performance have changed to the point where the data will not produce a fair price.

The contractor has a right to make those statements and take those positions in negotiations.  Remember:  the only obligation under TINA is to disclose all available facts, not to negotiate based upon what is to be disclosed.  This approach obviously takes a strong stomach and a willingness to walk away from the negotiations.

CONCLUSIONS

We have set out above the distinctions between the important terms of cost, price and estimate.  Whether the contract or the pricing action is TINA covered or not, these terms should be used with a degree of precision and concern for the potential for miscommunication to the customer. 

Simply because the government disagrees with the contractor’s reported price, cost or estimate is irrelevant.  The contractor does not need to change or accede to the government’s position on any of these issues.  It simply needs to be honest and transparent in telling the government what it truthfully believes is contained in its breakdowns or proposals.  


SUBCONTRACT TERMS AND CONDITIONS NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES: THINKING THINGS THROUGH BEFORE YOU ACT AT THE PRIME AND SUB LEVEL

Additional Resources in this Section:

It is a commonly held belief that there are standard terms and conditions that contractors must include in all subcontracts, and that subcontractors must accept.  This is, in fact, largely untrue.  Very few clauses must be included in a subcontract and most of those deal with clean water, non-discrimination and other socio-economic issues.  Those clauses impose obligations that are required by federal law in any event, so it does not matter whether the clause is included or not.

A different approach is needed, one that focuses on clauses the prime wants or the sub doesn’t want – a classic negotiation situation.  The purpose of this monograph is to cause you to think about those issues in the context of your own prime subcontract negotiations.

A number of texts are available that include suggested terms and conditions.  The ABA Public Contract Section publishes such a text.  It would be wise to have a collection of these materials in every subcontracts department so you have examples of clauses.  But that doesn’t mean you should use these clauses or that they are required, or that you cannot draft something better for your particular situation, whether you are a prime or a sub.  This is an area where robotic approaches are inappropriate.

A. Flowdown Provisions

Contrary to what many people think, there are very few clauses that absolutely have to be flowed down from (1) the federal government, to (2) the prime contractor, and then (3)  to the various tiers of subcontractors.

But there are basic clauses that are probably most important to a prime in a subcontract.  They are: (1) changes, (2) inspection, (3) terminations, and (4) warranties.

All of these clauses are NOT mandatory flowdowns. While it may be very wise to flow these clauses down to protect the prime or the subcontractor, they are not clauses that must be flowed down. Therefore, they are not non-negotiable items.  Although the prime may think differently, these clause are fully negotiable by the subcontractor if it has sufficient bargaining power.

B. Items That Must Be Considered During Subcontract Negotiations

The federal government recommends and suggests that certain clauses be flowed down.

For example, the FAR suggests that the Termination for Convenience clause (or the same) language be included in subcontract terms. Further, if it is not included, the government may not pay for recoveries in excess of what would have come out of the standard, federally oriented termination for convenience.

Obviously, this is a clause that needs to be flowed down for protection purposes even though it is not mandatory.

C. “Standard” Terms and Conditions

There are, in effect, no standard prime contract or subcontract terms and conditions. While the prime or the subcontractor may insist on having their terms or their “boilerplates” included, all they are doing is stating their preference that you use their terms and conditions. There is no reason not to take logical and polite exception to the terms, and negotiate for terms you want.

1. Taking Exceptions to Terms and Conditions

Politeness, truthfulness and openness are always best if you cannot accept a term for one reason or another. The other side may have had other contractors complain about similar terms, and they may decide to say, “all right, we will take it out if we can agree on other things.” If necessary, give them the basis for your objection. However, if you do not have to give a basis for an objection, do not do so. The other side may come up with a different basis from yours on its own, and pull the clause.

Another technique that many people use is to try to give up from, or agree to no more in the subcontract, than the federal government would require of its prime contractor. An example is the inclusion of an onerous Notice of Changes clause, which a subcontractor would have difficulty complying with. In this situation, the subcontractor could simply state, “we will accept the Federal Clause as a provision—after all that is what the government is requiring of you, and it would be unnecessary or unfair to require more of us.”

If you know the federal clauses, it would be a good opportunity to fall back on them as a baseline that you do not want to go beyond. This is true for all important terms and conditions. American Pipe and Steel Corp. v. Firestone, 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961) (meaning of term “equitable” adjustment in a subcontract—federal concept applied).

2.    Particular Terms and Conditions

As indicated above, there are particular terms that need additional focus in every subcontract negotiation:

a.    Changes Clause

The Changes Clause is one of the most important clauses. It is one of, if not the only way, that contract prices and schedules can be changed. A subcontract cannot be accepted if it contains a Changes Clause that it does not understand the operation of. As stated, while the federal clause is not perfect, at least people understand it, and there are numerous board and court decisions interpreting it. Go with predictability. Remember, in a commercial subcontract, the Changes Clause should be bilateral, not unilateral. Can this be negotiated in other subcontracts?

b.    Inspection Clause

The standard federal inspection clause is also hardly perfect, but it also has definite rights and obligations that people tend to understand. It is much better to use this clause than to do nothing, or do something incomplete because under UCC 2-513 the prime contractor can often then inspect in “any reasonable manner.” That is certainly unacceptable.

Inspections should be closely defined in terms of the parties’ rights and obligations, and most importantly as far as standards for inspection and rejection. Next to the Changes Clause, the Inspection Clause, and any clause dealing with terms of acceptability criteria are highly important. They state the final close out standards by which performance is completed and items must be accepted and paid for. Pay particular attention to negotiation of this clause and its details. Remember, also, that such requirements tend to be scattered through more than one provision neatly labeled, “Inspection.”

D.   Warranty Provision

The Federal Government often does not use warranty provisions. Once an item is accepted, the federal government’s only protection and remedy is for latent defects. At the subcontract level, commercial parties generally have some kind of warranty provision.

Most companies attempt to do two things with the warranty provision. They want to only be obligated to “replace or repair” items, and not be subject to broad payment obligations for “damages.” Repair and replace obligations are predictable. If you are running production lines, you know how many items roughly are being returned. You can use that in your future pricing. You know the cost to repair and replace, and whether doing so is inexpensive, or if it is expensive, at least such costs are predictable.

Secondly, many companies are attempting to cap out warranty obligations, and so state in a Warranty Clause, which holds that in any event, the company will not pay more out than a set amount, or the total subcontract price, to respond to claims of the prime contractor. Why would you want to sell an item—for example, a radio for $10,000.00, and then be open to claims of $100,000.00? Selling a radio, and knowing you will only have to pay the profit on the sales price back, i.e. $1,000.00, sets at least a predictable limit on damage claims coming back against a company that you can live with.

E. Assignment Issues

It is often stated in the prime’s boilerplate for subcontracts that items of work cannot be subcontracted or assigned to other certain parties without the prime’s permission.

This may not be enforceable in court.  This provision can, and often does, provoke disputes. Have a clear idea of what to do about further subcontracts, say so politely, and offer to keep the prime informed. The prime will often consent to such a provision. However, do not give the prime contractor the right to approve any subcontracts as that can provoke disputes and work stoppages. If no provision is in the subcontract, the U.C.C. permits further subcontracting. U.C.C. 2-210.

F. Technical Data Rights

There is an excellent separate course on data rights. Subcontractors have peculiar rights they need to be attentive to. If they have specific things that are being utilized that have technical data rights (proprietary/trade secrets), and items are being sent to the federal government, subcontractors need to make sure there is no dispute later about ownership of the data.

You may need to get a predetermination of those rights from the prime or the contracting officer to be sure there is no misunderstanding about who owns the underlying technical data. This is especially true when items are being substantially modified, and then sent up the chain to the government. The government could argue that at least the modifications are theirs with unlimited rights given the inclusion of standard data rights clauses. If this is not the case, it needs to be clearly spelled out. Moreover, subcontractors with highly proprietary projects need to look carefully at technical data clauses or other limitations thereon, and probably fight to get them all out of the subcontract. If the item is commercial, of course, no such clauses should be included.

G. Model Subcontractor Systems?  They can Work.

As can be seen from all of the foregoing materials, there are numerous decisions that need to be made during the subcontracting process when subcontractors are in their formation stage.

Having individual subcontract administrators on either the prime’s or subcontractor’s side constantly running to their superiors to get clearances to modify a clause or delete a clause is obviously an inefficient way to proceed.

Some large companies have developed a policy or operations manual that gives guidance to individual subcontract administrators on both sides so that they may determine on their own the levels of flexibility that they have in subcontract negotiations.

For example, a company may decide that it will not allow any modification in its cost or pricing data requirements or its warranty clauses without the corporate general counsel’s approval. That may well be a wise course, in light of the fact that essential legal issues are involved.

However, having the general counsel’s office review all subcontract terms and conditions has not worked for a number of companies. Particularly, if there is a high volume, it is not possible to have each subcontract have a thoughtful review by the legal department.

A Manual?

A “management by exception” policy is probably the best course. A detailed policy manual that allows individual subcontract administrators on each side to know what they can and cannot agree to, and where they must go for an approval to deviate, seems like the most logical course. It is what many large companies use that have significant volumes of subcontract activity.

Once a system is agreed to in a company, the issue then becomes how does one decide what the company’s policies are in subcontract terms and conditions. Does the company, if it is a prime, want to have very strong terms and conditions, middle-of-the-road terms and conditions, or easy terms and conditions?

The Consequences

Relatively easy terms and conditions minimize negotiation time and objections, and lead to speedier contract placements. However, that particular prime contractor may be leaving something on the table in terms of additional useful requirements that it could get.

Many prime contractors and large subcontractors, particularly in the aerospace industry, have onerous terms and conditions. They are much more difficult to comply with than what the federal government requires of them. This often leads to extended negotiations and impasses with both sides finally going back to agreement on some middle-of-the-road approach after the expenditure of significant effort.

Would it not have been easier to start with a middle-of-the-road approach to begin with? Are onerous provisions going to be enforced? We suggest some may not under the unconscionable terms provision of U.C.C. 2-302.

A historical approach in deciding in how to deal with each individual clause is often best. More senior people, who deal with subcontracts on a daily basis over a period of time in the particular business or industry, know what terms and conditions are generally acceptable, what are not, and where compromises may be made. They also know the company’s business, and what terms and conditions it must have.

A Complete Review and Decisions

The authors have been involved in counseling situations in which companies set aside four consecutive Saturday mornings, and have these experienced people meet to go through the specific company’s terms and conditions discussing the pros and cons of what to include and what not to include. On some occasions, teams were assigned (consisting of two or three people) to deal with specific clauses that were identified as problems from the company’s perspective. Some companies are particularly concerned about warranties, indemnities, or termination clauses. The individual small team can then present their recommendations and findings back to the entire group to make a final decision.

At some point, the entire approach and recommendations need to be discussed with and approved by counsel. They should also be circulated to other interested parts of the company to see if they agree with the approach.

Once this has been done, all of the company’s relevant experience in terms of the people that are in the company from a historical perspective, as well as technical skills, have been blended into the final product. The final product will not be perfect; there will be errors and mistakes, and the other side in negotiations will no doubt object to various terms and conditions. However, the approach has been systematic, and has been the company’s best efforts to get a manageable set of terms and conditions, as well as give guidance to individuals as to how to proceed.

Prime/Subcontract Relationships

1. Introduction:  The Basis of the Relationship.

The rise in outsourcing, teaming, partnering and other types of arrangements have caused prime federal contractors to shift increasing initial work responsibility to other companies: subcontractors.  This focuses increased attention on understanding the difficult issues in the prime/subcontract relationship.

This relationship is political, economic, as well as legal/contractual.  Far too much attention tends to be placed in the United States on the legal and contractual aspects of it.  International companies, (i.e. Asian and European), tend to place far more emphasis on the economic and political portion of this relationship.  Indeed, many of these companies deal with their subcontractors solely on an economic and political basis:  Is the subcontractor producing high quality products at a reasonable price?  Is it delivering on time? Can it be relied upon?  Often the vendor is not the lowest cost vendor and there may not be signed written contractual documents in effect once the business relationship has been established.

What can we learn in the United States from the experience of prime/subcontract relationships in foreign countries?  We can probably learn to be more focused on the business aspect of the relationship and how the subcontractor really supports the prime contractors efforts with its federal customer.  Contract clauses, provisions, and requirements are basically irrelevant if the subcontractor is not providing high quality work on time and at a reasonable price in a non-adversarial way that supports the prime contractor’s efforts with its customer.

2. The Paradox in the Federal Government’s Interest and Role in Subcontract Relationships with Primes.

It is often said that the federal government has no relationship whatsoever with subcontractors.  It contracted with the prime contractor and paid fees to the prime contractor to manage all of the work, including whatever work the prime has subcontracted.  Therefore, the federal government has no relationship and no interest in dealing with various subcontract issues.

Like many general statements, this statement can be true at various times.  It is certainly not correct when there are problems in the relationship between the prime and the subcontractor.  At that point, the government, notwithstanding lack of privity, is very interested in issues of the relationship between the prime and the sub.  In addition, the government may be at times intrusive into this relationship when it is perceived to be in its economic or social interest to do so.  We set out below areas in which problems arise between primes and subs and the prime’s federal customer.

3.  Approval Process:  Desire for Oversight without Responsibility.

Unlike commercial contracts, the federal government often does not retain the right to approve a prime’s selection of its subcontractors.  In commercial contracts, it is often common to see a provision prohibiting all subcontracting unless there is specific approval by the customer. And, the buyer often asserts it has complete discretion whether to give that approval or not.  This may not be true under state law.

At the federal level, while the government may not choose to retain the right in its contractual document to approve subcontractors, it has some scrutiny and control over subcontract selection during the proposal process.  The government is within its right in a negotiated procurement in questioning the prime contractor about its subcontractor selections (and their proposals) because this goes to the basis of the business bargain. 

If the prime contractor responds to various questions and answers by enumerating various subcontractors it will use, and specifying functions and approaches that they will use to do the work, the contractor will havedifficulty after award in shifting away from that subcontractor.  See TRW, Inc.  (GEODSS), ASBCA No. 27,299, 27,602, 87-3 BCA ¶ 19,964.  (When the contractor wants to switch approaches to save money after award.)

In addition, there are standards for Approval of Subcontractor clauses set forth in the (FAR Subpart 44.2.)  Approval requirements for subcontractors and use of the clause are largely discretionary.  The clause is seen most often in cost type and incentive contracts, as well as in larger construction contracts that may be fixed price.  These clauses provide for the government to approve subcontractors after contract award.  They provoke problems and disputes and have resulted in a significant amount of litigation. 

Litigation generally takes the form of disputes over what the government’s actual approval rights for vendors are.  Can the Government simply refuse to approve vendors that it doesn’t like or thinks are risky?  The answer to that is probably, no.  The Government has to exercise its approval authority in a reasonable fashion over vendors.  See cases collected at 3 CCH Government Contract Reports ¶ 21,540.75 et. seq.

At the same time the Government can certainly raise reasonable questions and ask for data before it approves the vendor.  A contractor should be prepared to respond promptly to reasonable requests for such information. 

But, if the Government simply chooses not to approve because it thinks the vendor proposed may fail, that is not a satisfactory reason.

Example:  The contractor has received a prime contract from the Department of Transportation to install a train washing system at a government depot.  It recognizes that there are only several suppliers of the actual washing mechanisms.  In the past, the government has used a European concern whose price for the subcontracted items is $1.7 million.

The contractor finds a large American company that has recently purchased a small business that provides similar types of equipment and quotes $700,000 to do the work.  The government disapproves the vendor because it does not have sufficient experience in the government’s view. 

Is this permissible?  The answer is likely, no. The government probably ends up paying the $1 million vendor price difference via a constructive change order.

4. Applying the Government Approach to Vendor Selection; Contractor Procurement System Reviews (CPSR’s).

The government has a formal procedure for larger contractors in which it reviews their entire procurement system periodically.  If it approves the system, then it does not approve most individual subcontract actions.  There is an extensive listing of the things that a contractor will be inspected for in terms of its procurement system when these reviews take place every several years.  (FAR 44.303) 

Contractors who have gone through such procurement system reviews invariably say that the primary focus of the government is on reviewing vendor procurements to see what level of competition has been obtained.  Contractors should learn from this experience.  The government wants to see the rationale and level of competition among vendors or a written explanation as to why such competition was not possible. 

This is an area in which reasonable paperwork makes sense; not for paperwork’s sake, but for the fact that it can reflect several years after the fact when one of these inspections is taking place that a contractor has a system in place, in which he routinely obtains competition to the maximum extent possible from all vendors.

Be sure such system is in place on a day-to-day basis.  In preparation for a CPSR type inspection, a contractor should do his own random sample to be sure competition is being obtained and it is documented in the files for inspection.  If it is not, the contractor had best put in place some serious upgrades immediately and explain that to the inspection team in the introductory briefing when they arrive.  It is not unusual to have fifty government employees on a CPSR team in the contractor’s plant for a week or two doing such a review.

5. Federal Government Direction to Prime Contractors To Use Specific Subcontractors: Again, Oversight without Responsibility.

In numerous ways the government on occasions directs, encourages or suggests that prime contractors use specific vendors. 

CONCLUSION

We hope the foregoing materials have shown you that there are no standard terms and condition, few mandatory flowdown clauses, and really not much federal intrusion into what the prime and subcontractor do.

The subcontract between the prime and the subs is essentially a commercial undertaking.  The prime and the sub can do what they want and what they are able to negotiate between themselves.

In the final analysis, it is the economic and political relationship between the prime and the sub that is of utmost importance.  The legal part of the transaction is much less important.

 


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